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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Em­
ployment Act (ADEA).l The Department of Labor's Wage and 
Hour Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis­
sion (EEOC) subsequently promulgated in 1979 interpretative reg­
ulations concerning those amendments. 2 The combined legislative 
1. 	 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, 29 
U.S.C.A. §§ 621, 623, 624, 626, 631, 633a, 643 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 29 
U.S.C. H 621-634 (1976» (hereinafter referred to as the 1978 amendments) amended 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as 
amended by 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621, 623, 624, 626, 631, 633a, 634 (West Cum. Supp. 
1979) (hereinafter referred to as ADEA). 
2. A chronology of regulations which have been proposed or promulgated by 
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor (hereinafter referred to as 
Department of Labor) and more recently by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) will be of assistance to the reader. The Department of Labor 
Interpretative Bulletin concerning the ADEA, originally appeared at 33 Fed. Reg. 
9172 (1968) (presently codified at 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1978». After the enactment of the 
1978 amendments, the Department of Labor decided to publish a series of regula­
tions interpreting different aspects of the ADEA. The key interpretative regulation 
concerns ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976), as amended by 29 U.S.C.A. § 
623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (hereinafter § 4(f)(2» and its consequences for em­
ployee benefit plans. The § 4(f)(2) regulation appeared in proposed form in Septem­
ber 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264 (1978) (hereinafter referred to as Proposed Interpreta­
tive Bulletin). The § 4(f)(2) regulation appeared in final form in May 1979. 44 Fed. 
Reg. 30,647 (1979) (hereinafter referred to as the Final Interpretative Bulletin). Still 
forthcoming are EEOC Guidelines on § 4(f)(2). See note 6 infra. 
Anoth,er important regulation considers § 12(c)(I) which constitutes the principal 
exception to the general requirement of the 1978 amendments establishing 70 as the 
mandatory retirement age. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(c)(l) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amend­
ing 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976». Section 12(c)(I) permits the mandatory retirement at age 
,65 	or later of bona fide executives and high policymaking employees receiving an­
nual retirement benefits of $27,000 or more. The Department of Labor published its 
proposed interpretation of § 12(c)(I) in December 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,147 (1978). 
The EEOC republished it with minor modification in November 1979 as a final in­
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and regulatory actions require significant changes in the personnel 
practices of, and the employee benefit plans3 sponsored by, pri­
vate sector employers. Although the 1978 amendments became 
effective for most employers on January 1, 1979,4 it is the recent 
terpretation. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979). For a discussion of the § 12(c)(l) exception 
see text accompanying notes 248-92 infra. . . 
Another exception to the mandatory retirement age of 70 is ADEA § 12(d), 29 
V.S.C.A. § 631(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 29 V.S.C. § 631 (1976)), which 
provides a temporary exception until July 1, 1982 for employees age 65 to 70 serving 
under a contract or similar arrangement of unlimited tenure, at an institution of 
higher education. The Department of Labor proposed its interpretation of § 12(d) in 
December 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,153 (1978). The EEOC republished it with minor 
modification in November 1979 as a final interpretation. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979). 
The § 12(d) exception is of limited interest and is not further considered in this 
article. 
Finally, the EEOC has proposed an interpretation of involuntary retirement: 44 
Fed. Reg. 68,858 (1979). For a discussion of involuntary retirement see text accompa­
nying notes 238-47 infra. 
3. 	 Although the term "employee benefit plan" is used in ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 
V.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976), as amended by 29 V.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 
1979), it is not defined anywhere in ADEA. The term is defined, however, in the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 3(3), 29 V.S.C. § 1002(3) (1976). The 
Department of Labor, however, rejected the use of this definition because it encom­
passes plans which provide benefits whose cost does not increase with the age of the 
participants. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (1979). For a discussion of the Department of La­
bor's narrower definition of employee benefit plan see text accompanying notes 
554-64 infra. 
4. The 1978 amendments § 2(b), 29 V.S.C.A. § 631(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) 
(amending 29 V.S.C. § 631 (1976)), eliminated the 65 mandatory retirement age for 
most affected employees in private industry as well as state and local government 
employees on January 1, 1979. 
For employees whose mandatory retirement was required or permitted by a col­
lective bargaining agreement in effect on September 1, 1977, the mandatory retire­
ment age of 65 expired on the earlier of January 1, 1980 or the termination date of 
the collective bargaining agreement. [d. 
There is already a controversy concerning the involuntary retirement prior to age 
65 pursuant to the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan which occurred prior 
to the effective date of the 1978 amendments. The Department of Labor and the 
EEOC take the position that involuntary retirement prior to age 65 pursuant to a re­
tirement plan adopted or amended after 1967 has been illegal since the enactment of 
the ADEA in 1967. 44 Fed. Reg. 68,859 (1979). The Federal agencies and aggrieved 
employees, however, have had mixed success in convincing Federal courts of the 
correctness of their position to retroactively apply the 1978 amendments prohibiting 
involuntary retirement. See Marshall v. American Motors Corp., 475 F. Supp. 845 
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Kuhar v. Greensburg-Salem School Dist., 466 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. 
Pa. 1979); Davis v. Boy Scouts of America, 457 F. Supp. 665 (D.N.J. 1978). Contra, 
Marshall v. Atlantic Container Line, 18 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 
Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1979); Marshall 
v. 	Baltimore & 0 R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1978). 
Since the ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 V.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976), as amended by 29 
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publication of the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin 
concerning age discrimination in employee benefits, rather than 
the amendments to the statute, which will cause employers to con­
sider revising their pension and welfare benefit plans to conform to 
the new requirements. The Interpretative Bulletin was published 
on May 25, 1979. 5 Its finality, however, pas been diminished by 
the transfer of jurisdiction over ADEA to the EEOC which is 
planning to publish its own guidelines. 6 While the EEOC is con­
sidering further changes in its guidelines for retirement, it supports 
the general principles and most of the specific rules expressed by 
the Department of Labor in the final Interpretative Bulletin. 7 
The promulgation of the Interpretative Bulletin represents the 
most significant expansion of federal regulation affecting employee 
benefit plans since the enactment of the Employee Retirement In­
come Security Act (ERISA) in September 1974. 8 The Department 
of Labor and the EEOC, however, have published interpretations 
with only slim authority in statute or the legislative history of the 
ADEA and the 1978 amendments. 9 Many attorneys and most em­
ployers are unaware of the new regulations and have not reviewed 
U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979), Interpretative Bulletin did not appear 
until five months after the January 1, 1979, effective date, the Department of Labor 
and the EEOC made limited concessions as to the date on which compliance was re­
quired. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,647 (1979). See text accompanying notes 121-300 infra. 
5. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1979). 
6. Section 2 of Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 
19,807, transferred on July 1, 1979, all functions relating to the administration and 
enforcement of the ADEA, as amended by the 1978 amendments, from the Secretary 
of Labor to the EEOC. Although the EEOC concurred with the Department of 
Labor's Interpretative Bulletin on ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976), as 
amended by 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (in fact, the EEOC staff 
participated in its drafting), the EEOC announced in July 1979 that it will not adopt 
the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletins and will publish its own guide­
lines on the ADEA. Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 30,657 (1979) with id. at 37,974. (EEOC 
announcement of intent to issue new guidelines). The EEOC announced that em­
ployers may continue to rely upon Department of Labor Interpretative Bulletins and 
Wage and Hour opinion letters until new guidelines are published by the EEOC. [d. 
at 37,974. 
7. Speech of EEOC Vice-chairman Daniel E. Leach to the Southern Pension 
Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia (Nov. 15, 1979), reprinted in Legal Times of 
Washington, Nov. 26, 1979, at 17, col. 1 (hereinafter referred to as Leach's Speech). 
See Huffman, EEOC Mulls About-Face On Pension Accruals, Legal Times of 
Washington, Oct. 22, 1979, at 1, col. 1. 
8. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1003, 
1021-1031, 1051-1061, 1081-1086, 1101-1114, 1131-1144, 1201-1204, 1221, 1222, 1231, 
1232, 1241, 1242, 1301-1309, 1321-1323, 1341-1348, 1361-1368, 1381 (1976) (herein­
after referred to as ERISA). 
9. See notes 18-20 infra. 
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their employee benefit plans in light of them. Perhaps this inac­
tion indicates a growing indifference to the ever increasing federal 
regulation of the private sector. 
This article has four focuses. The first section focuses on the 
degree of deference which the Interpretative Bulletin and future 
EEOC Guidelines are entitled to in light of the ADEA, its legisla­
tive history and other laws affecting employee benefit plans. The 
second section considers the general principles expressed in the In­
terpretative Bulletin. The third section analyzes in detail the appli ­
cation of the Interpretative Bulletin to specific employee bene­
fit plans. The fourth and final section suggests how employers and 
their attorneys should approach their task of reviewing their em­
ployee benefit plans. 
II. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S INTERPRETATIVE BULLETIN AND 

EEOC's GUIDELINES-A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 

The ADEA, since its original enactment in 1967, has prohib­
ited employers from diSCriminating against employees on the basis 
of age. Prior to the enactment of the 1978 amendments, the prohi­
bitions against employment discrimination were limited to individ­
uals 40 to 65 years of age, the so-called "protected age groUp."10 
The principal changes made by the 1978 amendments were to 
strike down involuntary retirements because of agell and to extend 
the upper limit of the pr()tected age group to 70. Otherwise, the 
Act is essentially the same as when originally enacted. 12 
The Act forbids an employer to "discriminate against any indi­
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or priv­
ileges of employment, because of such individual's age. "13 Section 
10. ADEA § 12,29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976). 
11. The 1978 amendments, §§ 2(a), 5(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 623(£)(2), 631(a), (West 
Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(2), 631 (1976)). Other changes 
were: Elimination of any mandatory retirement age for most Federal employees; ad­
dition of the right to a jury trial on issues of fact regarding the recovery of amounts· 
owing as a result of a violation of the ADEA; elimination of the notice of the Depart­
ment of Labor intent to sue for a violation and its replacement with a charge; and 
tolling of the statute of limitations during conciliation efforts. The 1978 amendments 
§§ 5(a), (e), 7(c)(I), (d), (e)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c), (d), (e), 633(a) (West Cum. Supp. 
1979) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 633(a), (d), (e) (1976). 
12. In 1974, the ADEA was amended to include within the scope of its cover­
age federal, state and local government employees (other than elected officials and 
certain aides not covered by civil service) and to expand coverage from employers 
with 25 or more employees to employers with 20 or more employees. ADEA § 
28(a)(I)-(4), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), (c), (f) (1976). 
13. ADEA § 4(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l) (1976). Private sector employers cov­
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4(f)(2) of the ADEA is the key exception to this broad protection 
against employment discrimination based on age. 14 Prior to the en­
actment of the 1978 amendments, section 4(f)(2) provided: 
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, 
or labor organization . . . (2) to observe the terms of . . . any 
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, 
or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the pur­
poses of this [Act], except that no such employee benefit plan 
shall excuse the failure to hire any individual. 15 
The reason for the 1978 amendment to section 4(f)(2) was to 
overturn legislatively the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann.16 The Court permitted the 
involuntary retirement because of age of an employee within the 
protected age group if the retirement was pursuant to a bona fide 
employee benefit plan. 17 As part of the 1978 amendments, Con­
ered include any business engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce with 
at least 20 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceeding calendar year. ld. § ll(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976). 
Whether affiliated businesses are considered one employer or several distinct em­
ployers is a question of fact turning on the degree of control exercised by one affili­
ate over the others. See, e.g., Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 
(N.D. Ga. 1973); Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Neb. 1973), 
afI'd, 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974). 
14. There are three other important exceptions to the general prohibition 
against discrimination based upon age. First, employers with less than 20 employees 
are not subject to ADEA. ADEA § ll(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976). Second, an em­
ployer may discriminate based upon age "where age is a bona-fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the operation of the business ...." ld. § 4(f)(1), 
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976). An employer who seeks to use age as a bona fide occu­
pational qualification (BFOQ) must show (i) that the BFOQ is reasonably necessary 
to the essence of the employer's business and (ii) have a factual basis for believing 
that older applicants would be unable to perform the job or that it is impractical for 
the employer to judge the individual ability of each job applicant on an individual­
ized basis. See generally Arritt v. Grissell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. 
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. 
Supp. 453, reconsid. denied, 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976). The proposed 
EEOC Interpretation simply states that the BFOQ exception involves a facts and cir­
cumstances issue which is to be narrowly construed and the burden of proof of es­
tablishing the BFOQ is the employer's who relies on it. Proposed Interpretation 29 
C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1979). Third, an employer may discharge an employee for "good 
cause." ADEA § 4(b)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 623(b)(3) (1976). 
15. 29 U.S.c. § 632(b)(2) (1976). 
16. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). 
17. Prior to the enactment of the 1978 amendments, most employers had retire­
ment plans estab!ishing the age of involuntary retirement at age 65, the normal re­
tirement age under their retirement plans. Since age 65 was outside of the then 
protected age group of 40 to 64, the question of age discrimination because of invol­
untary retirement within the protected age group rarely arose. A few employers, 
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gress superseded the McMann decision by adding a new final 
clause to section 4(£)(2). It provided: H[N]o such seniority system or 
employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary re­
tirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this title 
[an employee between the ages of 40 and 70] because of the age of 
such individual. "18 
In order to take advantage of the section 4(£)(2) exception and 
provide lesser benefits to older workers, an employer must demon­
strate: (i) The plan is bona fide; (ii) the lower benefits are provided 
in observance of the terms of a plan; (iii) the plan is not a subter­
however, established retirement plans with a normal retirement age of less than age 
65. The issue arose as to whether § 4(f)(2) exempted the employer from the general 
prohibition against discrimination in employment. Three circuit courts of appeals ad­
dressed this issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit con­
strued § 4(f)(2) to permit the involuntary retirement, solely on the basis of age, of the 
employee within the protected age group, although the employer could not establish 
the economic costs to the plan. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th 
Cir. 1974). In Brennan, the Fifth Circuit held that retirement based solely on age 
was permitted by the terms of an employee benefit plan which was established prior 
to the ADEA thereby "eliminating any notion that [the plan] was adopted as a sub­
terfuge for evasion." Id. at 215. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 
1977), cer!. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978), upholding an involuntary retirement under 
an employee benefit plan based upon forced retirement of an employee within the 
protected age group was permitted by § 4(f)(2) only if "legitimate considerations 
other than an employer's preference for youth justified the forced retirement[s]." Id. 
at 222. An involuntary retirement provision, the Court said, must have "some eco­
nomic or business purpose other than arbitrary age discrimination." Id. at 221. The 
third and most important case to consider the issue was McMann v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that § 4(f)(2) resolved in the neg­
ative the issue of whether an employee within the protected age group can be 
mandatorily retired pursuant to the terms of a bona fide non-subterfuge employee 
benefit. 
In order to resolve these conflicting interpretations of § 4(f)(2), the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in McMann. The Supreme Court in United Air Lines, Inc. v. 
McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977), held that the ADEA was not intended to invalidate 
retirement plans instituted in good faith before its enactment. Id. at 203. The Court 
further rejected any requirement for employers to demonstrate a business or eco­
nomic purpose to justify involuntary retirement pursuant to such plans. Id. After the 
Supreme Court's decision,- the 1978 amendments, including an amendment to § 
4(f)(2), were enacted. The Conference Committee Report clearly indicated a Con­
gressional intent to invalidate involuntary retirement pursuant to a plan within the 
protected age group. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1978] 3 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 528-29. While resolving one issue concerning em­
ployee benefit plans, Congress created a host of new legal issues for employee bene­
fit plans by raising the protected age group to 70. 
18. The 1978 amendments § 2(a); 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 
1979) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976)). 
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fuge to circumvent the Act; and (iv) the plan cannot excuse a re­
fusal to hire or a forced retirement prior to age 70 because of age. 
Section 4(f)(2) has been generally interpreted to permit 
employers to offer different and lesser employee benefits to old­
er workers. Concomitantly, it has been understood that a refusal to 
hire someone in the protected age group violates the ADEA. Thus, 
while it is illegal for an employer to refuse to hire an older worker, 
it is legal to pay lesser benefits to that older worker once hired. As 
a result of the 1978 amendments, involuntary retirement because 
of age of any employee within the protected age group is illegal. 
Section 4(f)(2) is, however, unclear as to whether a plan which 
pays reduced benefits to older workers is a "subterfuge to evade 
the purposes of the Act," if the benefit differential cannot be jus­
tified by age related cost considerations. The Department of La­
bor's consistent position has been that reduced benefits may be 
paid to older workers if the cost of providing the benefit is at least 
equal to the cost of providing benefits to younger employees. Spe­
cifically, in 1969 the Department of Labor issued what has become 
known as the equal cost or equal benefit interpretation of section 
4(f)(2). It said: 
A benefit plan will be considered in compliance with the statute 
where the actual amount of payment made, or cost incurred, in 
behalf of an older worker is equal to that made or incurred on 
behalf of a younger worker, even though the older worker may 
thereby receive a lesser amount of [pension or retirement] bene­
fits or insurance coverage. 19 
In other words, the Department of Labor has permitted an older 
worker to be paid a lesser benefit than a similarly situated younger 
worker only if the cost of providing the benefits to both workers is 
equal. 20 
There is no statutory basis for the proposition that a plan 
which does not provide equal benefits or require equal employer 
19. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1977) (emphasis added). 
20. The 1969 Interpretative Bulletin, while indicating that a plan meeting the 
equal cost or equal benefit standard would be deemed to be nondiscriminating, did 
not rule out the possibility that a plan not meeting the equal cost or equal benefit 
test would satisfy § 4(£)(2). In effect, the 1969 Interpretative Bulletin appears to have 
established the equal cost or equal benefit rule as a "safe harbor." Only after the 
1978 amendments were enacted did the Department of Labor set forth the proposi­
tion that, with the exception of retirement plans, equal cost or equal benefit is the 
sole test for discrimination in employee benefit plans. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,265 (1978). In 
fact, the legislative history of the 1978 amendments is not clear on the issue and cer­
tainly does not justify this more restrictive interpretation. See note 22 infra. 
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costs is a "subterfuge" which fails to satisfy section 4m(2). The leg­
islative history of the 1967 Act21 and of the 1978 amendments22 is 
21. The lack of a clear legislative history occurred because Congress focused in 
1967 on the hiring of older workers and in 1978 on the involuntary retirement of 
older workers rather than amount of benefits to be provided under employee benefit 
plans. There are, however, scattered references to employee benefit plan discrimina­
tion in both the 1967 and 1978 legislative history. 
Nowhere in the 1967 legislative history is the equal cost or equal benefit rule for 
employee benefit plans articulated. The legislative history speaks in general terms of 
reduced benefits. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967), re­
printed in [1967] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2213; S. REP. No. 723, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967). 
While the 1967 legislative history indicates that a total cutoff of benefits to older 
workers is permitted, the Department of Labor has interpreted § 4(f)(2) to permit 
lesser benefits. Thus, the Department of Labor recently summarized the original 
Congressional intent in 1967 as follows: 
In fashioning the Section 4(f)(2) exception with respect to employee benefit 
plans, Congress explicitly recognized that the cost of providing certain bene­
'fits to older workers is greater than providing the same benefits to younger 
workers. To require that the same benefits be provided to all workers with­
out regard to age, Congress feared, would discourage the employment of 
older workers or would unduly burden the employer and thereby jeopardize 
the continued maintenance and operation of such plans. 
43 Fed. Reg. 43,264 (1978). 
While the difference between excluding an older worker and paying a lesser 
benefit to older workers may seem to be a subtle shift in interpretation, it is critically 
important. The Department of Labor and the EEOC now interpret benefit reductions 
to be nondiscriminatory only when they are cost justified. Differences in costs of 
benefits, however, are rarely so great as to justify a total cutoff of benefits (i.e., the 
exclusion of an ,older worker). Since the 1967 legislative history authorized a total 
cutoff in benefits, it seems doubtful that Congress interpreted § 4(f)(2) in 1967 as 
requiring an equal cost or equal benefit justification. 
22. In the legislative history of the 1978 amendments, there are a number of 
references to an economic cost justification being required for welfare benefit plans. 
Nowhere, however, is there a statement that equal costs or equal benefits is the sole 
justification. 
In fact, the legislative history supports the status quo. The Senate Report, for ex­
ample, indicates that employee benefit plan practices which were lawful prior to the 
1978 amendments were not to be disturbed: "Presently some employers reduce cov­
erage for older workers under [welfare benefit] plans or increase the required em­
ployee contribution as workers advance in age. This bill would not alter existing law 
with respect to these practices." S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977). 
Congressman Hawkins (D., Cal.) indicated during the floor debate that either an 
economic purpose or a business purpose was sufficient. 124 CONGo REC. H2270 
(daily ed. March 21, 1978). 
Congressman Pepper (D., Fla.) cautioned that "a total cutoff of benefits" would 
not be permitted "without full economic justification." Id. at H2275. Similarly 
Congressman Weiss (D., N.Y.) said § 4(f)(2) required providing "reasonable benefits 
to ... older employees." Id. at H2276. 
The most explicit statement of the equal cost or equal benefit principle is con­
tained in a colloquy between Senators Javits (R., N.Y.) and Williams (D., N.J.). Id. 
at S4450-51 (daily ed. March 23, 1978). 
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not clear about whether equal employer costs are the sole permis­
sible justification for paying a lower benefit to an older employee. 
Moreover, the requirement that the plan not be a subterfuge has 
been the subject of surprisingly little litigation. In fact, one of the 
few court decisions which considers the issue of whether a cost jus­
tification is required as a condition of satisfying section 4(f)(2) is 
McMann. 23 In McMann, the Supreme Court did not require a cost 
justification. It held that to be a subterfuge an employer's intent to 
violate the law must be demonstrated. 24 The Court defined a sub­
terfuge to be "a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion. "25 
As indicated previously, the McMann decision interpreted section 
4(f)(2) to permit a forced retirement at age 60 under the terms of 
an employee benefit plan. Specifically, the Court indicated that a 
pension plan provision in effect prior to the enactment of the 
ADEA which required retirement prior to age 65 could not be con­
sidered to be a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. 26 The 
logic of the decision was that a pension plan provision written in 
1941 could not possibly have been adopted by the employer in 
order to circumvent the antidiscrimination requirements of the 
ADEA. "To spell out an intent in 1941 to evade a statutory re­
quirement not enacted until 1967 attributes, at the very least, a re-
The Javits.Williams colloquy, in effect, quotes with approval the 1969 Depart­
ment of Labor Interpretation which established the equal cost or equal benefit prin­
ciple and states that the 1978 amendments were not intended to alter existing prac­
tices. Id. Paradoxically, the Department of Labor quotes the Javits-Williams state­
ment for support in the 1979 Interpretative Bulletin which dramatically altered its 
interpretations of § 4(f)(2). 44 Fed. Reg. 30,649 (1979). The Department of Labor, 
however, only acknowledged that the "old interpretation was less specific than the 
new." Id. at 30,657. 
The 1969 Department of Labor Interpretative Bulletin does not state that equal 
cost or equal benefits is the sole justification for a discriminatory employee benefit 
plan under § 4(f)(2). It is at least implicit in the 1969 interpretation that other justifi­
cations were possible. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in McMann v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 434 U.S. at 192, explicitly recognized that noneconomic justifications 
were possible. Given that: (1) there was no change in the relevant statutory language 
(i.e., bona fide and subterfuge) in 1978, (2) the legislative history of the 1978 amend­
ment is ambiguous at best, and (3) there is an express rejection of the cost justifica­
tion as the exclusive rule in McMann, how much validity has the Department of La­
bor's general interpretation, first articulated in September 1978, that the sole 
justification for age based reductions in employee benefit plans is actuarially signifi­
cant cost considerations? 
23. 434 U.S. at 192. 
24. Id. at 203. 
25. [d. 
26. Id. 
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markable prescience to the employer. "27 More importantly, the 
Court also ruled that treating older employers less advantageously 
than younger employees is not a per se violation of section 4(£)(2) 
"requiring an employer to show an economic or business purpose 
in order to justifY the subterfuge language of the Act. "28 
While Congress did amend section 4(£)(2) to prohibit involun­
tary retirement of employees within the protected age group, it did 
not amend section 4(£)(2) with respect to the definition of a "sub­
terfuge." Consequently, one can argue that the Court's statement 
in McMann defining "subterfuge" as requiring an intent to evade 
the purposes of the Act is still good law. It effectively rejected a 
per se rule of equal employer costs. In summary, while the De­
partment of Labor and the EEOC require a cost justification, the 
Supreme Court in McMann did not. One can anticipate that some 
employers will choose not to comply with the equal cost or equal 
benefit interpretation which is the key to the federal enforcement 
position. In so doing, employers will defiantly cite McMann as a 
defense to their actions. 29 
Another element of uncertainty concerning the reliability of 
the Department of Labor's interpretations of the ADEA has been 
introduced as the result of the transfer of jurisdiction for adminis­
tration and enforcement of the ADEA from the Department of La­
bor to the EEOC. This transfer was effective July 1, 1979, pur­
suant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978. 30 The preamble to the 
May 25, 1979, Interpretative Bulletin indicates that the EEOC 
concurred with the Department of Labor's interpretations and 
enforcement policies as expressed in the Bulletin. 31 In fact, the 
EEOC staff participated with the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor in the development of the Interpretative Bul­
letin. 32 After the publication of the Interpretative Bulletin and the 
transfer of jurisdiction, the EEOC announced that while the De­
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. There are no court decisions yet considering the effect of McMann on em­
ployee benefits after the passage of the 1978 amendments. One significant issue is 
whether the McMann language rejecting economic justification as a per se test for in­
voluntary retirement is dicta and was not intended to be applied generally to em­
ployee benefit issues. 
30. See Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 
(1978). 
31. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,647, 30,657 (1979). 
32. Leach's Speech, supra note 7. 
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partment of Labor's interpretations may be relied on temporarily 
by employers, the EEOC intends to publish its own guidelines. 33 
This turnabout in the EEOC's policy raises the possibility that the 
EEOC's enforcement position will differ from the interpretations 
expressed in the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin. 
The EEOC is probably contemplating more stringent guidelines 
relating to retirement plans. 34 
In summary, the current state of the law interpreting the rea­
soning of "subterfuge" in section 4(£)(2) is: The equal cost or equal 
benefit rule which is the key interpretative principle for both the 
Department of Labor and the EEOC is open to question. Further, 
the Department of Labor and the EEOC do not always appear to 
agree on its application. Given this unsettled state of the law, it is 
questionable how much attention should be given the regulatory 
interpretations. 
The Interpretative Bulletins and the EEOC's guidelines repre­
sent the enforcement position of the federal government. There is, 
however, no statutory expression of the deference which should be 
paid by employers to the Department of Labor's Interpretative 
Bulletins or to EEOC's guidelines. The Supreme Court in Skid­
more v. Swift & CO.35 stated: 
[Such interpretations do provide informative guidance.] [W]hile 
not controlling upon courts by reason of their authority, [they] 
do constitute a body of experience and inform judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The 
weight of such judgment in a particular case will depend upon 
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control. 36 
One should note, by way of comparison, instances in which 
Congress has delegated to a regulatory body the power to promul­
gate regulations, such legislative regulation is subject to less scru­
tiny. Judicial review of legislative regulations is limited to insuring 
consistency with underlying statutes, promulgation procedures and 
the Constitution. 37 Additionally, consideration should be given to 
33. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,974 (1979). 
34. See text accompanying notes 196-221 infra. 
35. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
36. General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. at 140). 
37. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965). 
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whether the interpretative regulation was made contemporaneously 
with, or shortly following, the enactment of the statute38 and 
whether the statement is one of long standing which has continued 
in effect during a reenactment of the underlying statute. 39 As 
noted above, the Department of Labor has consistently required an 
equal benefit or an equal cost justification since 1969. Whether the 
equal benefit or equal cost principle will be upheld under the 
Skidmore standard is impossible to predict. One can anticipate, 
however, that employers, at a minimum, will seek to litigate the 
more objectionable and unsupported positions derived from the 
equal benefit or equal cost analysis taken in the Interpretative Bul­
letin and in EEOC's guidelines. 
Employers who choose to rely in good faith on the Depart­
ment of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin will be protected from lia­
bility for violations of the ADEA in suits by the EEOC, and also 
possibly in private lawsuits. 40 The EEOC has stated that until its 
new rules are issued, employers will be protected if they comply 
with the Interpretative Bulletin. 41 Thus, the Interpretative Bulletin 
represents a "safe harbor," albeit a temporary safe harbor, in which 
employers may choose to rely. Employers who follow such safe har­
bor provisions may not be exposed to retroactive liability if a court 
subsequently determines that the positions taken by the Depart­
ment of Labor in the Interpretative Bulletin were incorrect. 
One final cautionary note is in order. Since its enactment in 
1967, the ADEA has permitted states to pass their own age dis­
crimination laws,42 which most states have done. 43 In many in­
stances, their provisions differ significantly from the federal law. 
38. See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969). See also K. DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 503, at 126 (3d ed., 1972). 
39. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,274-75 (1974). 
40. The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 10,29 U.S.C. § 259 (1976), applies to ac­
tions under the ADEA. ADEA § 7(e)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 
1979). McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 219-20 n.3 (4th Cir., 1976), 
rev'd on other grounds, 434 U.S. 192 (1977); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1976). See accord 
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 720 n.37 
(1978) (denying retroactive monetary relief in a title VII sex discrimination suit 
where employer relied upon "somewhat confusing" Labor Department administra­
tive interpretations). 
41. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,974-75 (1979). 
42. Simpson v. Alaska, 423 F. Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976), aff'd, 608 F.2d 1171 
(9th Cir. 1979). ADEA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976). See also 124 CONGo REC. 
H9972-73 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977) (House rejected amendment to ADEA to 
preempt state law), S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977). 
43. See Appendix A (listing of state age discrimination laws and key provi­
sions). 
392 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:379 
For example, while the ADEA does not protect individuals less 
than 40 years old, some state laws have no lower age limit. 44 Like­
wise, while the ADEA does not apply to any employer having 
fewer than 20 employees, some state laws do not require a mini­
mum number of employees. 45 Coinciding with the enactment of 
the 1978 amendments, several states have amended their state 
antidiscrimination laws to expand protection of their employees to 
age 70. 46 Some states even have removed the maximum protected 
age limit altogether. 47 Certain state laws, however, do not contain 
an exemption equivalent to the bona fide plan exemption found in 
section 4(£)(2) of ADEA.48 Consequently, employers will have to 
examine carefully state antidiscrimination laws to determine 
whether their employee benefit plans satisfy state law require­
ments which may be more stringent than federal law require­
ments. 49 
To complicate compliance further, the ability of states to pass 
more stringent antidiscrimination laws is limited indirectly by 
ERISA. ERISA does not preempt any federal law but does super­
sede all state laws which pertain to an employee benefit plan. 50 
The failure of state laws to include a bona fide plan exception may 
cause the state antidiscrimination law to conflict with ERISA. Al­
though a state law may be enacted as an antidiscrimination law, it 
may, in fact, be a prohibited state law regulating employee benefit 
plans. 51 
44. ld. 
45. ld. 
46. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Pamph. 1979) (amending id. at § 
31-126 (West 1949)): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 13.261 (West Pamph. 1979); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 363.02 (West Pamph. 1980) (amending id. at § 363.02 (West 1955)); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.17 (Page Pamph. 1979) (amending id. at § 4101.17 (Page 
1961)); R.l. GEN. LAWS § 28-6-1 (Pamph. 1980) (amending id. at § 28-6-1 (1962)). 
47. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1 (West Pamph. 1979) (amending id. at § 1420 
(West 1959)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (Supp. 1979) (amending id. at § 
354-A:8 (1965)). 
48. Some states had age discrimination laws with no upper age limit prior to 
the 1978 amendment. See Appendix. 
49. See, e.g., Simpson v. Alaska, 423 F. Supp. 552 (D. Alaska 1976), afI'd, 608 
F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1979). 
SO. ERISA § 514(a),(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a),(b) (1976). 
51. There was some concern expressed prior to the adoption of the 1978 
amendments that state age discrimination laws not interfere with ERISA's regulation 
of all matters "rel;ting" to employee benefit plans. 124 CONGo REC. S4,451 (daily ed. 
Mar. 23, 1978); id. S4,767 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1978). 
The Depar~ent of Labor Interpretative Bulletin on § 4(£)(2) contains a caution­
ary note that the failure of ADEA to preempt state age discrimination laws does not 
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In summary, employee benefit plans should be reviewed in 
light of the 1978 amendments, the legislative history and the Inter­
pretative Bulletin. The Interpretative Bulletin, however, is not 
controlling upon courts. It is a safe harbor for employers. While 
employers may choose to ignore some of the more unsupported po­
sitions in the Interpretative Bulletin, they may be forced to litigate 
the issues involved. In addition to federal law, employee benefit 
plans should be reviewed in light of applicable state age discrimi­
nation laws. Employers must decide whether to ignore state laws 
to the extent such laws are preempted by ERISA. The review and 
decision making process will require careful judgment of specific 
benefits. Section III of this article will assist the reader in judging 
how these benefits can be provided. 
III. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S AND EEOC's 

INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 4(f)(2)­

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

As previously indicated, section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA provides 
that it is not an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
observe the terms of any bona fide employment benefit plan, such 
as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subter­
fuge to evade the purposes of the Act. In absence of this section 
4(f)(2) exception, a reduction in employee benefits by an employer 
on the basis of age violates the ADEA because it clearly discrimi­
nates against an individual with respect to his or her terms, condi­
tions or privileges of employment. The Interpretative Bulletin sets 
forth the equal cost or equal benefit position of the Department of 
Labor and describes in great detail the extent to which section 
4(f)(2) authorizes certain reductions in employee benefits on the 
basis of age. 52 
affect the ERISA preemption of any state law which is related to an employee bene­
fit plan. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(g) (1979). The preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin 
quotes the colloquy between Senators Javits and Williams. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,657 
(1979). 
While no courts have decided whether ERISA preempts state age discrimination 
laws, several cases have considered ERISA's relationship to other employment dis­
crimination laws. See Pervel Indus. Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights, 468 F. 
Supp. 490 (D. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979) (ERISA preempts state 
sex discrimination law on pregnancy). Contra, Bucyrus-Eire Co. v. Department of In­
dus., Labor & Human Relations, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979); Goodyear Tire & Rub­
ber Co. v. Department of Industry, 273 N.W.2d 786, 793-97 (Wis. App. 1978); Brown 
Co. v. Department of Industry, 476 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
52. The Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin on § 4(f)(2) appeared in 
final form on May 25, 1970 and is the key interpretation of permissible discrimina­
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According to the Interpretative Bulletin, benefits provided to 
older workers may be less than those provided to younger workers 
only if every element required by section 4(f)(2) is "clearly and un­
mistakably met. "53 The three key elements of section 4(f)(2) are: 
(1) The plan is a "bona fide employee benefit plan"; (2) the lower 
benefits are provided in "observ[ance of] terms of" such 
plan; and (3) the plan or plan provisions are not a "subterfuge to 
evade the purposes of the Act. "54 
All three elements must be satisfied in order for the employee 
benefit plan to be considered in compliance with the ADEA in an 
employee benefit plan in which an older worker receives a lesser 
amount of benefits or insurance coverage. The Interpretative Bulle­
tin notes that the three elements are to be construed narrowly. 
The burden is on the employer to demonstrate compliance. 
A. Bona Fide Employee Benefit Plan 
The Interpretative Bulletin defines an "employee benefit plan" 
as a plan which provides employees with fringe benefits. 55 For ex­
ample, a retirement, pension or insurance plan would be so catego­
rized. The section 4(f)(2) exception is inapplicable to wages or 
salaries. 56 The Interpretative Bulletin discusses the application of 
section 4(f)(2) to a number of specific types of employee benefit 
plans. The description of plans discussed in the Interpretative 
Bulletin and affected by the ADEA is apparently for illustrative 
purposes only. The Interpretative Bulletin discusses only pension, 
tion under ADEA for employee benefit plans. 29 C.F.R. § 860, (1979) (hereinafter 
referred to as the Interpretative Bulletin or the final Interpretative Bulletin). The In­
terpretative Bulletin was published in proposed form on September 22, 1978. 43 
Fed. Reg. 43,264 (1978). The EEOC has issued a proposed interpretation which by 
its terms adopts the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin without modifica­
tion. 44 Fed. Reg. 68,858, 68,862 (1979). The author understands, however, that the 
EEOC intended only to renumber the Interpretative Bulletin, but not to adopt it. In­
stead, as indicated in EEOC Vice Chairman Leach's speech, the EEOC is consider­
ing substantial changes in the interpretation of § 4(f)(2) with respect to retirement 
plans. Leach's Speech, supra note 7; Telephone conversation between author and 
John Pagano, EEOC, Office of General Counsel, Legal Counsel Division (Dec. 21, 
1979). 
53. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(I) (1979). 
54. ld. 
55. ld. at § 860.120(b). 
56. Compare the broad prohibition against discrimination in "compensation" 
with the narrower exception for "bona fide employee benefit plan, such as a retire­
ment, pension, or insurance plan...." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) (1976); 29 U.S.C.A. § 
623(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
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group life and health insurance and group long-term disability in­
surance plans. Other plans, such as insured sick leave plans, life 
insurance and disability plans funded by individual insurance 
products also constitute employee benefit plans which are subject 
to the ADEA.57 All employer provided fringe benefits fall within 
this definition. More surprising is that "employee pay-all" benefits 
are subject to the ADEA.58 
An employee benefit will be considered bona fide only if two 
prerequisites are met. First, its terms must be accurately described 
in writing to all employees. Second, it must actually prOVide bene­
fits in accordance with the terms of the plan. 59 In addition, em­
ployers are obliged to notify employees of any changes in the 
plan. 60 Satisfying the participant disclosure requirements of ERISA 
and its regulations are deemed to be sufficient for ADEA pur­
poses. 61 
The written disclosure requirement of ADEA will create prob­
lems for plans which are exempted from ERISA disclosure require­
ments. 62 Requiring written disclosure for ADEA purposes for plans 
which have already been granted statutory or regulatory exemp­
57. While all fringe benefit plans or programs are considered employee benefit 
plans for ADEA purposes, the only class of plan which can discriminate against older 
workers without the Department of Labor considering the plan to be a "subterfuge" 
is a plan in which age is an actuarially significant cost factor. The "subterfuge" re­
quirement is considered at length. See text accompanying notes 71-120 infra. 
58. Id. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
The rules for employee pay all plans are considered at length. See text accompa­
nying notes 102-120 infra. 
59. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1979). The 1969 Interpretative Bulletin had no writ­
ten disclosure requirements. [d. at § 860.120 (1969). 
60. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1979). 
61. Most importantly, ERISA requires each participant to receive a summary 
description "written in a manner to be understood by the average participant." 
ERISA § 102(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2 (1979). 
62. Certain employee benefit plans are exempted from the disclosure require­
ments of ERISA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1030 (1976), by statute or Department of Labor 
regulation. Congress exempted plans sponsored by government or church organiza­
tion and certain nonqualified deferred compensation plans. ERISA § 4(b)(I), (2), 
(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(I), (3), (5) (1976). In addition, the Department of Labor has 
exempted certain employee pay all plans, bonus plans, supplemental retirement bene­
fit plans, tax sheltered annuities and individual retirement annuity programs from, 
among others, ERISA disclosure requirements. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-1, -2, -3 (1979). 
One irony is that the Department of Labor, Pension-Welfare Benefits Administrator, 
exempted certain fringe benefit plans from ERISA disclosure requirements although 
there is specific statutory authority to require them, while the Department of Labor, 
Wage and Hour Division, imposed disclosure requirements to all employee benefit 
plans, without exception, although there is no explicit statutory authority to impose 
such requirements. [d. 
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tions from disclosure under ERISA is inconsistent policymaking. 
Furthennore, the requirement of a written plan and notice to em­
ployees goes beyond judicial interpretations of the bona fide re­
quirement. 63 For example, the Supreme Court in McMann ap­
peared to require only that the plan exist and pay benefits in order 
to satisfY the bona fide requirement. 64 
B. "To Observe the Terms" of a Plan 
The Interpretative Bulletin makes clear that the section 4(f)(2) 
exemption protects actions which might otherwise be discrimina­
tory only if the action is taken in accordance with the express 
tenus of the plan. 65 Unwritten procedures which provide a reduc­
tion in benefits for older workers are not protected by section 
4(f)(2).66 For example, an oral promise by the employer to pay 
benefits will not satisfY this requirement although the employer, in 
fact, pays the benefits promised. In addition, the Interpretative 
Bulletin requires that the discriminatory provision must not be an 
optional term subject to employer discretion. 67 Thus, many in­
fonnal employee benefit plans will have to be reduced to writing in 
order to continue providing reduced benefits to older workers. 
Some courts have rejected the notion that the discriminatory 
policy must be a written mandatory tenn of a plan. 68 The basis for 
the Department of Labor's position is that employees must have 
some opportunity to know of a discriminatory policy and to plan, or 
protest, accordingly.69 In addition, the mandatory application of 
the plan provision assures that the discriminatory provision will be 
equally applied to all employees of the same age. 70 
63. Courts have generaily interpreted bona fide as meaning only that the plan 
must actually pay benefits as promised. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 
F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Atlantic Container Line, 470 F. Supp. 71, 
72 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Aldendifer v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
~ 8874, at 5616 (C.D. Cal. 1978). 
64. 434 U.S. at 194. 
65. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(c) (1979). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 575 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Marshall v. Atlantic Containter Line, 470 F. Supp. 71, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Contra, 
Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Company, 500 F.2d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 1974) (Tuttle, J., 
dissenting); Marshall v. American Motors Corp., 20 Fair Empl. Proc. Cas. 575, 579 
(E.D. Mich. 1979). 
69. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(c) (1979). 
70. [d. 
397 1980] AGE DISCRIMINATION 
C. "Not a Subterfuge" 
In order to provide older workers lesser benefits under a bona 
fide employee benefit plan pursuant to section 4(£)(2), the plan 
must not be a subterfuge to evade the purpopes of the Act. The 
Department of Labor and the EEOC take the position that an em­
ployee benefit plan, other than a retirement plan, which prescribes 
lower benefits for older workers is not a subterfuge if such low­
er benefits are justified by actuarially "significant cost considera­
tions. "71 Actuarially "significant cost considerations" simply means 
that an employer providing unequal benefits must be prepared to 
show that the actual costs for benefits of younger and older em­
ployees are equal. A plan which provides lower benefits for older 
workers is not a subterfuge when the actual amount of payment 
made, or the cost incurred on behalf of an older worker, is equal to 
the actual amount of payment or cost incurred on behalf of a 
younger worker, even if the older worker receives a lesser amount 
of benefits or insurance coverage. 72 Age must be a significant cost 
factor.73 Consequently, the preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin 
concludes that an uninsured paid sick leave plan, like a paid 
vacation plan, does not fall within section 4(£)(2) because age is not 
an actuarially significant cost factor in such a plan. The preamble 
takes the position, however, that an insured paid sick leave plan, 
unlike a short term disability plan, may fall within section 4(£)(2). 
This would happen when the employer can prove that the expendi­
ture for the older workers' benefits is more costly.74 Although age 
71. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(a)(I), (d) (1979). While the EEOC has not yet publishkd 
its interpretation of § 4(f)(2), it is clear that the EEOC subscribes to the general prin­
ciple of permitting lower benefits for older workers only where justified by 
"actuarially significant cost considerations." . 
The general rule applied by the Labor Department is that age-based reduc­
tions in employee benefit plans must be justified by actuarially significant 
cost considerations. I have belabored the point but it should be kept firmly 
in mind. It is the test for compliance with the 4(f)(2) exception and will not 
be changed. I am reasonably certain of that. Indeed, the Commission is re­
viewing changes only that, fairly stated, would constitute deviations from 
that principle-exceptions which result in employee benefit cutoffs or re­
ductions which are not justified by actuarially significant cost considerations. 
Leach's Speech, supra note 7. 
72. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(l) (1979). 
73. [d. 
74. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,649-50 (1979). The preamble comments confuse 
two separate issues. The first is whether age is an actuarially significant cost factor in 
an uninsured paid sick leave plan. The second is whether an uninsured paid sick 
leave plan is an employee benefit plan described in § 4(f)(2). As indicated in the text 
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should be a significant cost factor, the distinction between an in­
sured and an uninsured plan is nonsensical. Benefits from a sick 
leave pl~m can be funded either by insurance contracts, through 
trusts or directly out of the general assets of the employer. What­
ever the funding vehicle, however, the cost of maintaining such a 
plan does increase with the age of the employee participant. Older 
workers tend to experience longer and more serious sicknesses 
than younger workers. This is true whatever the funding method. 
An uninsured sick leave plan should be within the section 4(£)(2) 
exception to the same extent as an insured sick leave plan. 
The Interpretative Bulletin's general introduction is unclear 
about how precise the equivalency in cost for an older worker and 
a younger worker must be. At one point, the Interpretative Bulle­
tin states that benefit levels for older workers may be reduced to 
the extent necessary to achieve approximate equivalency in cost for 
older and younger workers.75 In the next sentence, however, the 
Department of Labor states that an employee benefit plan will 
comply with the statute when the actual amount of payment made, 
or the cost incurred, on behalf of an older worker is equal to that 
made on behalf of a younger worker. 76 There is a distinct differ­
ence between approximate equivalency in cost and precise equiva­
lency in cost. 
The Interpretative Bulletin in its discussion of cost data, how­
ever, makes clear that the equivalency need only be approximate. 
Specifically, the Department of Labor requires that cost data must 
be valid and reasonable in order to justify a reduction benefit for 
older workers.77 This standard is met if the employer has cost data 
which shows its actual cost for providing a particular benefit over a 
"representative period of years. "78 In addition, an employer may 
rely on cost data for a "larger group of similarly situated employ­
ees. "79 If reliable cost data is not available, an employer may rely 
above the Department of Labor incorrectly concludes that age is not a significant 
cost factor. The preamble comment also concludes that an uninsured paid sick leave 
plan is not an employee benefit plan described in § 4(f)(2). This conclusion is at 
odds with the Interpretative Bulletin itself which defines employee benefit plan as 
an employer provided program which provides "fringe benefits." 29 C.F.R. 
§ 860.120(b) (1979). This broad definition should encompass a broad range of plans, 
including uninsured sick leave plans. 
75. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(l) (1979). 
76. Id. 
77. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(I) (1979). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. The proposed Interpretative Bulletin had a more rigid rule requiring an 
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on reasonable projections made from existing data. If an employer, 
either noninsured or experience rated by an insurance company, 
incurs costs which significantly differ from costs for a group of simi­
larly situated employees, the employer may not rely on cost data 
for the similarly situated employees when such reliance will result 
in significantly lower benefits for older workers.80 Precisely what is 
meant by "valid and reasonable," "representative period of years," 
"larger group of similarly situated employees" and "significantly 
differ" is unclear. What is clear, however, is that the Department 
of Labor decided to permit an employer to make adjustments in 
benefits on the basis of any reasonable data on benefit costS. 81 
As a practical matter, most employers probably will look to in­
surers to determine whether cost data will justify benefit reduc­
tions for older workers under insured plans. The compliance obli­
gation, however, is the employer's not the insurer's.82 Further­
more, it is not at all clear under existing case law whether an 
employer is legally entitled to rely on the insurance carrier.83 Em­
ployers, consequently, may wish to seek letters of representation 
from their insurers that the insurance contracts being issued to 
them satisfy the cost requirements of the Interpretative Bulletin. 
1. Determination of Cost Incurred 
Two methods are permitted under the Interpretative Bulletin 
to justify cost differences in employee benefit plans. The first 
method, the "benefit by benefit basis," requires cost reduction to 
be separately justified for each individual benefit. 84 In the benefit 
employer to sue its own cost data except when such data did not exist or was statis­
tically unreliable, in which case any reasonable actuarial data or benefit cost for sim­
ilarly situated employees could be used. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,269 (1978); id. at 43, 265 
(preamble to the Proposed Interpretative Bulletin). 
80. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(I) (1979). 
81. See 44 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (1979) (preamble to the Final Interpretative Bulle­
tin). 
82. ADEA § 4 prohibits age discrimination by employers, employment agencies 
and unions, but not by insurance companies. ADEA § 4, 29 V.S.C. § 623 (1976), as 
amended by 29 V.S.C.A. § 623 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). But see Spirt v. TIAA­
CREF, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), stating that an insurance company is an 
employer in a title VII sex discrimination case where the terms of the pension plan 
were in the insurance company's control in a functional sense. [d. at 1308. 
83. An employer may be held liable for sex discrimination under title VII in a 
pension plan where insurer used sex based actuarial tables to determine plan bene­
fits. EEOC v. Colby College, 598 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978); Sobel v. Yeshiva Vniv., 
477 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Peters v. Wayne State Vniv., 476 F. Supp. 1343 
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Spirt v. TIAA-CREFF, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
84. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(2)(i) (1979). 
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by benefit approach, adjustments must be made in the amount or 
level of a specific form of benefit for a specific event or contin­
gency. For example, higher long-term disability costs for older em­
ployees may justify a reduction in the amount of disability benefits 
for older workers on the basis of age, but not a reduction in any 
other benefit, such as a retirement benefit. The benefit by benefit 
approach does not justify the substitution of one form of benefit for 
another. This is so even though both forms of benefit are designed 
for the same contingency, such as death or income replacement. 
For example, if an older worker becomes disabled, he or she might 
be entitled to both retirement benefits and long-term disability 
benefits in order to provide for income replacement. Under the 
benefit by benefit approach, an employer would not be justified in 
redUcing a retirement benefit because of the increased cost of pro­
viding a disability benefit. 
The Departmjent of Labor never clearly defines "benefit. "85 It 
does, however, reject the broad notion of benefit as being all pay­
ments made upon the occurrence of a certain event such as retire­
ment, death or disability. This is known as an event by event 
test. 86 It also appears to reject the more narrowly defined approach 
defining a benefit in terms of the employee benefit plan producing 
the benefit. This is known as a plan by plan test. 87 The Interpreta­
tive Bulletin fails to discuss whether all benefits provided under an 
individual insurance contract constitute a single benefit. The Inter­
pretative Bulletin also fails to discuss the treatment of ancillary 
benefits. As a result, for those benefits which do not fit neatly into 
a particular category, questions remain as to how they should be 
treated. 88 
The second method, the "benefit package approach," permits 
cost comparisons to be made in the aggregate for bona fide em­
85. A benefit is vaguely defined in the Interpretative Bulletin as payments 
made in a specific form upon the occurrence of a specific event or contingency. Id. 
In the preamble, the Department of Labor itself acknowledges the "flexibility" in 
the definition. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,651 (1979). 
86. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,651 (1979). 
87. Id. 
88. For example, how is waiver of premium on account of disability under a 
life insurance contract to be treated? Is it a life insurance or a disability benefit? 
How is the accrual of benefits for disability under a pension plan to be treated? Is it 
a retirement or a disability benefit? How is an accidental· death and dismemberment 
benefit under a life insurance contract to be treated? Is it an accidental death/ 
disability benefit or a death benefit? How is a survivorship benefit under a retire­
ment plan to be treated? Is it a death or a retirement benefit? 
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ployee benefit plans. 89 The benefit package approach requires an 
employer to maintain an aggregate benefit cost level, but permits 
the employer to reduce or even eliminate some benefits while main­
taining other benefits at higher levels. In theory, the employer's 
entire fringe benefit package can be justified in the aggregate. Cost 
justification of individual benefits is unnecessary. The benefit pack­
age approach is, however, available only if the overall result is no 
lesser cost to the employer for the benefits of older workers, and 
the benefits to employees are not less favorable. 90 
The following example from the Interpretative Bulletin illus­
trates the application of the benefit package approach. 91 Assume an 
employer has two employee benefit plans, A and B. Age related 
cost data would justifY a 10% reduction in benefits for older work­
ers under each plan if a benefit by benefit apprlJach was used. Un­
der the benefit package approach, the employer may reduce the 
benefits under plan B br, 20% i~ the benefits under plan A are 
unreduced. If the benefits under plan A cost only one-half as much 
as the benefits under plan B, however, the benefits under plan B 
may be reduced by only 15% (10% plus 5%) because a greater re­
duction would reduce total benefit cost to the employer. The ex­
ample clearly illustrates that the cost of each benefit reduction still 
must be analyzed under the benefit package approach. 
What then, is the advantage of the benefit package approach? 
The benefit package approach, in theory, offers more flexibility to 
employers in benefit plan design. 92 An excessive reduction in one 
benefit can be justified by a modest reduction in another benefit. 
The Interpretative Bulletin, however, places so many limitations 
on the benefit package approach that it is unworkable for all but 
the largest employers. The benefit package approach is of limited 
value for several reasons. 
89. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(2)(iii) (1979). See preamble to Interpretative Bulle­
tin, 44 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (1979). The proposed Interpretative Bulletin forbade the use 
of a benefit package analysis. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,266 (1978). The proposal rejected the 
benefit package approach because an employee might receive a drastic benefit re­
duction in a benefit of particular value to him. Id. Also, the Department seemed con­
cerned about the complex actuarial analyses which are required under a benefit 
package analysis. ld. 
90. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2) (1979). 
91. ld. at (f)(2)(v). 
92. Many employers criticized the proposed Interpretative Bulletin's failure to 
permit the use of the benefit package approach claiming that a strict benefit analysis 
deprives employers and employees of the opportunity to design a fringe benefit 
package responsive to their needs. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,651 (1979). 
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First, only plans covered under section 4(£)(2) may be consid­
ered. Therefore, the entire compensation package, including salary 
and non-age related fringe benefits, such as paid vacation plans, 
group, legal insurance or uninsured sick leave plans, may not be 
reflected in the computation. For example, an employer cannot jus­
tify decreases in long-term disability benefits on the basis of an in­
crease in salary. 93 
Second, a retirement or pension plan may not be considered 
under the benefit package approach because such plans are not 
subject to the general rule requiring equal costs or equal bene­
fits.94 The exclusion of retirement plan benefits from use under the 
benefit package approach is particularly unfortunate since many 
pension plans provide ancillary disability and death benefits which 
could otherwise be taken into account. For example, a pension 
plan ,providing a death benefit after normal retirement date in ex­
cess of the cost of providing a death benefit for a younger worker 
cannot be used under the Interpretative Bulletin to justifY a reduc­
tion in group term life insurance for the older employee. 95 This re­
striction makes good plan design more difficult. Employers try to 
coordinate various benefits in order to take into account the needs 
of their employees at different ages. Employers try to avoid unnec­
essary duplication of benefits by coordinating different benefits 
from different plans which are designed to serve the same purpose. 
In our example, both the survivor income benefit under the pen­
sion plan and the group term life insurance benefit provide bene­
fits to the employee's immediate family upon his or her death. Un­
der the Department of Labor interpretation, however, these two 
benefits may not be interrelated. 
Third, the benefit package approach cannot justify reduction in 
health benefits for older workers in excess of the reduction which 
would be justified under the benefit by benefit approach. 96 The In­
93. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(i) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1979) (preamble to 
the Interpretative Bulletin). 
94. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(ii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1979) (preamble to 
Interpretative Bulletin). For a detailed discussion of the rules governing retirement 
plans see text accompanying notes 188-292 infra. 
95. The EEOC apparently is considering revising this rule to permit pre­
retirement death benefits under a pension, but not a profit-sharing plan to be used to 
justify reductions in other death benefits provided under a welfare benefit plan. 
UPDATE, newsletter of Towers, Perrin, Foster and Crosby, Boston, Mass. (July 25, 
1979). 
96. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(iii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1979) (preamble 
to the Interpretative Bulletin). 
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terpretative Bulletin justifies this restriction based on legislative 
history which emphasizes the fundamental importance of health in­
surance benefits to older workers. 97 
Fourth, reductions in benefits greater than that justified under 
the benefit by benefit approach must be offset by making another 
benefit available to the employees affected. 98 This restriction pre­
vents employers from trading away a benefit available to all em­
ployees for increased benefits available to relatively few employ­
ees. 99 
Fifth, employers who use the benefit package approach must 
be prepared to produce data to show that reductions are fully 
justified. 10o Employers will need to retain an actuary to prepare 
the cost analysis. Some employers will not be willing, or may not 
be able, to incur this additional cost. 
Small employers are least likely to use the benefit package ap­
proach. Normally, they will look to insurance companies to present 
a benefit plan to them. Insurance companies, in tum, will probably 
develop contracts which comply with the Interpretative Bulletin 
using the benefit by benefit analysis. The benefit package approach 
does not represent a practical marketing alternative for an insur­
ance company because it requires a thorough analysis of all em­
ployee benefit plans sponsored by the employer, some of which 
may not be provided by the insurance company involved. Since 
insurance companies will market products on the basis that 
each product is designed to comply with the benefit by benefit ap­
proach, employers purchasing those products, in tum, will be obli­
gated to justify their plans on a benefit by benefit basis. 
2. Age Ranges Used to Calculate Benefit Reductions 
The Interpretative Bulletin authorizes benefit cost comparisons 
in benefit reductions to be made on the basis of age brackets of up 
to five years. 101 Under an age bracket analysis, the average cost of 
97. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(f)(2)(iii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656 (1979) (preamble 
to the Interpretative Bulletin). 
98. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(iv) (1979); 44 Fed Reg. 30,661 (1979) (preamble to 
the Interpretative Bulletin). 
99. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,657 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
100. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(v) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,657 (1979) (preamble 
to the Interpretative Bulletin). 
101. The proposed Interpretative Bulletin permitted costs to be calculated only 
on a year by year basis. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,266, 43,269 (1978). The proposal would have 
prohibited the five year age bracket analysis customarily used to calculate, group life 
insurance costs. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979) (preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin). 
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a benefit for all employees within an age range must be equal to or 
greater than the average cost of a benefit for all employees in the 
immediately preceding age bracket of equal duration. For example, 
benefits for employees 60 to 65 years of age may be reduced only 
to the extent necessary to achieve cost equivalency with employees 
55 to 60 years old. Benefits for employees 65 to 70, however, may 
not be reduced to the extent necessary to achieve equivalency in 
cost with benefits for all employees within an age range of more 
than five years, for example, 18 to 64 years old. While the age 
range analysis is primarily used to determine benefit costs for 
group term life insurance, under the Interpretative Bulletin, age 
ranges may be used to analyze costs and benefit reductions for any 
employee benefit. 
3. Employee Contributions 
Many employee benefit plans require employees to pay some 
or all of the costs of providing benefits under a plan sponsored by 
the employer. In the Interpretative Bulletins, these plans are di­
vided into two classes. 102 The first class comprises those plans in 
which employees are required to contribute some or all of the cost 
of providing benefits under the plan as a condition of employment. 
Section 4(a)(I) of the ADEA prohibits discrimination in "terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment" in addition to prohibiting 
discrimination in compensation. 103 The Interpretative Bulletin 
takes the position that an older employee cannot be required as a 
condition of employment to make greater contributions in order to 
receive the same level of benefits as a younger employee. 104 The 
preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin justifies the Department of 
Labor's position by pointing out that if participation in the em­
ployee benefit is involuntary, requiring an older employee to make 
greater contributions does discriminate in compensation on the ba­
sis of age. The employee has no option but to receive less take 
home pay than a similarly situated younger worker. 105 
The second class includes those contributory plans in which 
participation by employees is voluntary. lOS The Interpretative Bul­
102. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(i), (ii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,659 (1979). 
103. ADEA § 4(a)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) (1976). 
104. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(i) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,659 (1979). 
105. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979); cf. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (requiring female employees to contrib­
ute more than male employees to a retirement plan violates title VII because the fe­
male's take home pay would be less than a similarly situated male employee). 
106. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,659 (1979). 
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letin takes the position that benefit plans sponsored by employers 
which require employee contributions as a condition of participa­
tion and receipt of benefits are subject to the ADEA. If participa­
tion is voluntary, a plan will not be lawful when the cost of partici­
pation to older workers is discriminatory on the basis of age. l07 The 
Interpretative Bulletin further divides voluntary employee con­
tribution plans into three categories, applying separate rules to 
each category. The first category is the voluntary employee pay-all 
plans. lOS Older workers, like younger workers, may be required to 
contribute the full amount of increased cost for their age as a con­
dition of participation. At the same time, the Interpretative Bulle­
tin prohibits an employer from excluding older employees from 
participation in such plans or requiring older employees to contrib­
ute more than the amount of the cost increase justified by in­
creased age. The Department of Labor ,never clearly states why 
voluntary employee pay-all plans are subject to the ADEA. Since 
participation is voluntary, older workers are free\ to avoid reduc­
tions in take home pay by declining to participate in the plan. Con­
sequently, there is no discrimination in compensation. Since an 
employee can decline to participate in a plan, the plan certainly is 
not a term or condition of employment. Apparently, the Depart­
ment considers the right of an older employee to participate in a 
voluntary employee pay-all plan on an equal basis with a younger 
employee to be a privilege of employment. 109 
The second category of voluntary plans is a noncontributory or 
employer pay-all plan. llo Where no employee participant is re­
quired to make any contribution to a plan, there is obviously no 
age based discrimination against older workers. The Interpretative 
Bulletin provides, however, that when participation is voluntary 
and the employer pays all costs for younger workers, the employer 
cannot require older workers to contribute towards any age related 
cost increase. 111 The Department of Labor's position is contra­
107. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652-53 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
108. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii)(A) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (pream­
ble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
109. ADEA § 4(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l) (1976), prohibits employer discrimi­
nation in "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of 
an individual's age." Id. The Department of Labor has taken an inconsistent positiori 
on voluntary employee pay all plans by exempting them from the requirements of 
Title I of ERISA. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-1,-2,-3 (1979). 
110. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii)(B) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (pream­
ble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
111. Id. 
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dicted by the legislative history of the 1978 amendments which 
pennits any additional costs to fund benefits for older workers to 
be borne by the older workers. 112 
The third category of voluntary employee contributory plans 
includes contributory plans in which the employer and the em­
ployees share in the plan costs. 113 The Interpretative Bulletin takes 
the position that when participation in the benefit program is vol­
untary and the employee bears part of the cost for providing the 
benefit, the employer cari require an older employee to bear a pro­
portionate share of the increased cost as a condition of participation 
in the plan.114 
In so doing, the Interpretative Bulletin gives employers two 
alternatives. The employer and the older worker can be required 
to share in the increased cost of providing the same benefit to 
older workers as is provided to younger workers. This would be 
appropriate so long as employee contributions are a fixed per­
centage of the total cost of their benefit. In the alternative, the 
employer may make the same dollar contributions for both older 
and younger workers causing a reduced benefit to be paid to the 
older worker. The Interpretative Bulletin notes that the older em­
ployee may be given the option to make additional contributions 
necessary to receive the same level of benefits as the younger em­
ployee. 115 
112. "Presently some employers reduce coverage for older workers under [wel­
fare benefit] plans or increase the required employee contribution as workers ad­
vance in age. This bill would not alter existing law with respect to these practices." 
S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977). 
113. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii)(C) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (pream­
ble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
114. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(ii)(C) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (pream­
ble to Interpretative Bulletin). The preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin gives the 
following example: Assume that the cost of a contributory group insurance plan in­
creases in total monthly premium from $20 to $30 per month for each covered em­
ployee as the employee moves from a lower to a higher five year age bracket range. 
Further assume that employer and the employee each contribute 50% of the monthly 
premium. The employer can increase the employee's monthly contribution from $10 
to $15. The employer's contribution, however, could not be less than $15 per month 
(such as $10) because this would require the older employee to match employer con­
tributions more than dollar for dollar, something that younger employees are not re­
quired to do. In the alternative, the employer may choose to reduce the level of ben­
efits so that the total premium remained at $20, of which the older employee paid 
$10. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
U5. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(4)(iii) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (1979) (preamble 
to Interpretative Bulletin). 
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4. Coordination with Government Sponsored Benefits 
Many employee benefit plans reduce benefits by considering 
government provided benefits such as social security or Medicare 
benefits. This approach is called "integration." Integration permits 
an employer to fix the total amount of benefit from all sources 
which an employee will receive. Concomitantly, it reduces em­
ployer costs. 
The Interpretative Bulletin permits government sponsored 
benefits, such as Medicare and social security, to be integrated 
with employer provided plan benefits so long as older employees 
enjoy no lesser total benefit than younger employees. 116 Integra­
tion with government sponsored benefits is permitted although the 
availability of such benefits may be based on age and the applica­
tion of integration may make employer costs for older employees 
less than for younger employees. For example, Medicare benefits 
are only available to employees age 65 or 0Ider.117 Health care 
benefits may be offset by Medicare benefits. Once Medicare bene­
fits are considered for older workers, the cost of providing health 
care benefits for younger workers may actually be less than the 
cost of providing health care benefits for older workers. us 
5. Discrimination Against Retirees 
One issue not discussed in the Interpretative Bulletin is 
whether an employee welfare benefit plan may exclude or provide 
a reduced benefit which is not justified by age related cost consid­
erations to retired employees. Employer provided welfare plan 
benefits such as group term life insurance and group health insur­
ance are sometimes provided to retirees. 119 Since the ADEA only 
prohibits discrimination in the context of an employer-employee 
relationship,120 employers need not provide welfare plan benefits 
116. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(e) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979) (preamble to In­
terpretative Bulletin). 
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c), (0) (1976). Part A (§ 1395(c» entitlement is also avail­
able to employees under age 65 who have been entitled to monthly cash benefits for 
at least 24 months for disability under social security or the railroad retirement pro­
gram. Part A also provides hospital insurance benefits. Part B (§ 1395(0» is a volun­
tary contributory supplement benefit program covering physicians services and other 
expenses not covered under Part A (§ 1395(c». 
118. The specific rules for integrating Medicare benefits with health care plans 
are discussed. See text accompanying notes 159-176 infra. 
119. D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 375, 
437-38 (3d ed. 1973); S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 403 (9th ed. 1976). 
120. ADEA § 4(a)(I); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) (1976). 
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to former employees or may provide benefits reduced in excess of 
reductions justified by age related cost considerations. 
IV. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S AND EEOC's INTERPRETATIONS 

OF SECTION 4(f)(2)-THE RULES FOR SPECIFIC TYPES 

OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 

A. Application of Section 4(f)(2) to Welfare Benefit Plans 
In formulating its rules for welfare benefit plans,121 the De­
partment of Labor has consistently applied its general principle 
that age based reductions in employee benefit plans must be jus­
tified by actuarially significant cost considerations. Since the EEOC 
supports this ,general principle, few changes are likely to be made 
by EEOC interpretations for welfare benefit plans. 122 
l. Group Term Life Insurance 
The common practice of life insurance companies has been to 
market group term life insurance policies which provide life insur­
ance benefits at a constant level unless the insured had attained a 
specified age, frequently age 65. At that time, the benefits either 
would be reduced to a percentage (usually 50%) of the amount pay­
able through age 65 or would cease eptirely.123 
The cost of providing life insurance' coverage increases with 
age because of the increased likelihood of mortality. The Interpre­
tative Bulletin permits the amount of life insurance coverage to be 
reduced to the extent justified by an increase in insurance costs 
under either the benefit by benefit approach or the benefit package 
approach. 124 The proposed Interpretative Bulletin requires the cost 
comparison to be calculated on a year by year basis. 125 The final 
Interpretative Bulletin modifies this rule and permits cost compari­
sons to be made by comparing average costs for periods of up to 
121. Welfare benefit plans are employee benefit plans other than deferred com­
pensation or retirement plans. Welfare benefit plans, as defined by ERISA, include a 
plan which provides medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits in the case of sick­
ness, accident, disability, death or unemployment; such plans may also include other 
.benefits such as vacation or scholarship plans. ERISA § 3(1); 29 U.S.C. lO02(1) 
(1976). 
122. See note 71 supra. 
123. D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 375; S .. HEUBNER & K. BLACK, 
supra note 119, at 407. 
124. 29 C.F.R. ~ 860. 120(f)(l)(i) (1979) (benefit by benefit); id. at § 860.120(f)(2) 
(benefit package). 
125. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,269 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(3)). 
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five years. 126 This modification was made because of the insurance 
industry's longstanding practice of calculating premiums for group 
life insurance on the basis of average cost for five-year age brack­
ets, rather than on yearly cost. 127 Whatever age bracket is used for 
purposes of cost compwison, comparisons of cost must be made for 
the immediately preceding age group even if the coverage is equal 
for all years up to age 65. 128 While age based reductions are per­
mitted, a total cut off of life insurance benefits at any age within 
the prohibited group cannot be justified under the benefit by ben­
efit approach because the cost of providing life insurance coverage 
does not increase so greatly in anyone year as to justify a total ces­
sation of coverage. 129 The Interpretative Bulletin, however, makes 
clear that life insurance coverage may cease at the earlier of separa­
tion from service or age 70. 130 
If the employer adopts a group term life insurance plan which 
is designed to provide year by year reductions, there will be an an­
nual reduction in life insurance coverage beginning at a specified 
age, probably at age 65. The preamble to the Interpretative Bulle­
tin makes clear that reductions in benefit levels can commence at 
any age, not only at 65. 131 The proposed Interpretative Bulletin 
stated that the Department of Labor believed standard actuarial ta­
bles justified a benefit reduction of 8% each year for employees be­
tween 65 and 70. This "safe harbor" was deleted from the final ver­
sion of the Interpretative Bulletin without explanation. 132 It may 
have been dropped because the Department of Labor was not sure 
of the accuracy of the figure. At least one major life insurance com­
pany has determined that the annual increased cost of coverage for 
its group term life insurance between the ages of 65 and 70 jus­
126. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(3) (1979). 
127. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979) (preamble to Iuterpretative Bulletin). 
128. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(3) (1979) (comparing age brackets 65-70 
with 60-65 with 55-60). 
129. "[A] total denial of life insurance, on the basis of age would not be 
justified under a benefit by benefit analysis." 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b)(I)(i) (1979). 
Similarly, the proposed Interpretative Bulletin stated that "expulsion from a life in­
surance plan, on the basis of age, would never be justified." 43 Fed. Reg. 43,269 
(1978). 
130. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(i) (1979). 

·131. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,652 (1979). 

132. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,269 (1978). Although the proposed eight percent "safe 
harbor" was deleted, the final Interpretative Bulletin does state that "all the em­
ployee benefit practices specifically permitted under the proposed interpretation 
published September 22, 1978, would be in compliance with the final interpretation 
published now." 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,657 (1979). 
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tifies an increase of approximately 8%. Utilizing this alternative, a 
group term life insurance program might provide a constant benefit 
of 100% payable through age 64. There would be an 8% reduction 
in death benefits at ages 65 through 69. Consequently, the death bene­
fit at age 69 would be approximately 66% of the death benefit pay­
able at age 65. 133 No death benefit would be payable after age 70. 
The Interpretative Bulletin alternatively permits cost justified 
benefit reductions on the basis of average costs in five-year age 
brackets, rather than on the basis of yearly costS.134 Utilizing this 
alternative, the group term life insurance benefit would be a con­
stant amount until age 65. One major life insurance company has 
determined that a reduction of 33% for insureds between the ages 
of 65 and 69 can be justified on the basis of five-year age brackets. 
Thus, the death benefit between ages 65 and 69 would be 65% of 
the benefit payable prior to age 65. No death benefit would be 
payable on or after age 70. This single coverage reduction is easier 
to administer and simpler to communicate to employees. Addition­
ally, there may be a financial advantage. If most active employees 
retire on or before age 67~, the single reduction should be less ex­
pensive for the employer when compared to the costs of a year by 
year reduction beginning at age 65. 
Other variations in reductions are possible. It is permissible 
and more expensive for an employer to provide a fixed unreduced 
death benefit until age 70. Furthermore, any other variation in 
group term life insurance costs which is more generous than that 
justified by age related cost considerations is also permitted. 
Often the amount of group term life insurance benefit payable 
is based on employee wages or salaries or a multiple thereof, such 
as two times annual compensation. 135 The preamble to the Inter­
pretative Bulletin notes that increases in the cost of coverage for 
older workers which are generated by increases in wages or salaries 
cannot be taken into account for purposes of calculating age based 
increases in COSt.13S Consequently, when life insurance coverage is 
expressed as a multiple of salary for emp'loyees age 64 or less, the 
multiple and not the dollar amount of coverage must be reduced 
133. The eight percent reduction is eight percent of the prior year's amount. 
Thus the death benefit to age 64 would be 100%; at age 65, 92%; at age 66, 84.64%; 
at age 67,77.87%; at age 68, 71.64%; and at· age 69 or later, 65.91%. 
134. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(i) (1979). 
135. D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 358; S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, 
supra note 119, at 404. 
136. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1979). 
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for older employees. Increases in salary for employees 65 or older 
must generate increased life insurance coverage. The reason for 
this rule is that salary generated increases are not directly related 
to age. 
In addition to the death benefit, two ancillary benefits custom­
arily provided under a group life insurance contract were not ad­
dressed specifically in the Interpretative Bulletin. There is confu­
sion as to how these benefits should be treated. The first of these 
ancillary benefits is a waiver of premium benefit. Typically, em­
ployers will discontinue premium payments on an employee whose 
active employment has terminated due to total disability. Further­
more, disabled persons are frequently unable to convert their 
group term life insurance into individual life insurance for financial 
reasons. A waiver of premium protects the benefits of disabled em­
ployees. The typical waiver of premium benefit will permit the dis­
abled employee's life insurance coverage to remain in force if the 
employee becomes totally disabled while covered under the group 
insurance plan and remains disabled until death. 137 Waiver of pre­
mium provisions, however, typically require the employee to be 
under age 60 at the date of commencement of his total disabil­
ity.138 If disability occurs after age 60, the employer may treat the 
disabled employee as an active employee and continue paying the 
necessary monthly premiums to the insurer. More likely, the em­
ployer will stop paying premiums for the disabled employee and 
coverage will cease. If the waiver of premium benefit is considered 
a disability benefit, then by analogy to the rules pertaining to long­
term disability benefits described below,139 it is unlawful to cut off 
disability waiver of premium benefits when an employee reaches 
age 60. On the other hand, the amount of death benefit is not nec­
essarily affected by the existence or nonexistence of the waiver of 
premium provision. The continuation of the group life insurance 
death benefit is a function of the employer's willingness to continue 
premium payments. The waiver of premium provision is merely a 
financial arrangement between the employer and the insurer which 
relates only to the payment of premiums. Therefore, it is not 
within the scope of section 4(£)(2). 
Another common ancillary benefit provided under group term 
137. D. GREGG & v. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 374-75; S. HEUBNER & K. 
BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 567-68 (8th ed. 1972). 
138. See note 130 supra. 
139. See text accompanying notes 136-158 infra. 
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life insurance plans is the accidental death and dismemberment 
benefit (AD&D). The AD & D benefit pays additional amounts of 
benefit in case of accidental death. It also pays benefits for bodily 
dismemberment. The most common approach is to express the ac­
cidental death and dismemberment benefit as a percentage of the 
basic group life insurance benefit. This coverage provides a double 
indemnity feature. 140 
If AD & D benefits are classified as part of the life insurance 
benefit, such age based reductions are permissible. The definition 
of "benefit" under the Interpretative Bulletin, however, leads one 
to conclude to the contrary. The Bulletin states "Adjustments made 
on a benefit-by-benefit basis must be made in the amount or level 
of a specific form of benefit for a specific event or contingency. "141 
The Interpretative Bulletin, therefore, appears to classify accidental 
dismemberment coverage as a health or disability benefit rather 
than a life insurance benefit since the event requiring payment of 
the benefits is not death. Similarly, the contingency requiring pay­
ment of accidental death benefit is accidental death. Consequently, 
age based reductions based on the rising incidence of all deaths 
may be inappropriate. 
The Interpretative Bulletin requires, as a general matter, that 
benefits different in form or payable because of a different contin­
gency be independently justified by age related cost considera­
tions. 142 While the Interpretative Bulletin permits cost justified re­
ductions in the amount of group life insurance benefit, it does not 
indicate whether corresponding reductions may be made in AD 
& D benefits. 143 One might conclude that age based reductions in 
14.0. For example, the full principal sum for which the employee is insured un­
der the group life insurance benefit is payable if the employee dies as a result of an 
accident. For the loss of a hand at or above the wrist, or the loss of a foot by sever­
ance at or about the ankle, or for irrevocable loss of the sight of an eye, only one-half 
of the principal sum is payable. For the loss of more than one member in anyone ac­
cident, the full principal sum is available. Multiple benefits are payable as a result of 
anyone accident, but not in 'excess of the principal sum. Thus, the amount of benefit 
payable upon accidental death or dismemberment is a function of the percentage of 
group term life insurance benefit upon which the accidental death and dismember­
ment benefits are based, for example, 100% or 50% of the life insurance benefit. 
When a group life insurance contract reduces the amount of term life insurance 
death benefit payable starting at a specified age, there will be a corollary reduction 
in the amount of accidental death and dismemberment benefits payable. See D. 
GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 386-88; S. HEUBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 
119, at 407. 
141. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(2)(i) (1979) (emphasis added). 
142. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,651 (1979). 
143. Although the Department of Labor was requested to clarify the treatment 
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AD & D benefits, which are a function of life insurance reductions, 
are not pennitted by the Interpretative Bulletin. Another possibil­
ity is that the Interpretative Bulletin was not intended to regulate 
ancillary benefits. 
2. Long-Tenn Disability 
Long-term disability plans are designed to provide partial re­
placement of earnings during periods of disability caused byac­
cident or sickness. Typically, long-tenn disability income bene­
fits commence after salary continuance payments cease or after a 
specified waiting period. The amount of benefit is usually a fixed 
percentage of the employee's pay and continues while the em­
ployee remains disabled. There is, however, a maximum duration 
of time. The most common durations of benefits have been five 
years, ten years, or to age 65. 144 Many long-tenn disability plans 
provide benefits until the employee reaches age 65. This has been 
justified traditionally because disabled employees often are entitled 
at age 65 to nonnal retirement benefits from an employer spon­
sored pension plan and from social security. One source of provid­
ing for lost income is replaced simultaneously with another source. 
Another reason for curtailing disability benefits for ages over 65 is 
that detennination of disability for older employees is difficult. In­
finnities of age and disability become hard to distinguish. 
No age discrimination problems arise when the disability plan 
covers individuals for a fixed period of time or for life regardless of 
age. 145 Discrimination problems do arise, however, with plans 
which provide benefits until a specific age less than 70. The Inter­
pretative Bulletin expressly rejects disability plans which cut off 
disability payments at age 65. 146 Under the Interpretative Bulletin, 
an employer may tenninate disability benefits or coverage on the 
basis of age at 70. Further, reductions on the basis of age prior to 
70 may be made either in the level of disability benefits or in the 
duration of disability benefits. Reduction in either the level of 
benefits or the duration of benefits, however, must be justified by 
of accidental death and dismemberment and waiver of premium benefits in com­
ments to the proposed Interpretative Bulletin, the final Interpretative Bulletin is si­
lent on this point. Joint Letter from the American Council of Life Insurance and the 
Health Insurance Association of America to Francis V. LaRufTer, Jr., Wage and Hour 
Division, Department of Labor (Nov. 27, 1978). 
144. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,266 (1978) (preamble to Proposed Interpretative Bulletin); 
D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 404. 
145. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,266 (1978) (preamble to Proposed Interpretative Bulletin). 
146. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iii) (1979). 
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age related cost considerations. 147 Either the benefit by benefit ap­
proach or the benefit package approach may be used. 
U sing a benefit by benefit analysis, four alternative patterns of 
disability benefits are permitted by the Interpretative Bulletin. The 
first alternative is to provide long-term disability coverage to all 
employees until age 70. Since the upper limit of the protected 
age group is 70, cessation of benefits at that time is obviously 
permitted. 148 
The second alternative is to provide long-term disability bene­
fits to employees through age 70, concomitantly reducing the level 
of benefits for older workers. These benefit reductions, however, 
must be cost justified. The Interpretative Bulletin provides no indi­
cation as to what level of reduction would be justified between 
ages 65 and 70, except to say that a total cut off of disability bene­
fits at older ages is not permissible. 149 
The third alternative is to reduce the duration of benefits for 
older workers in accordance with a safe harbor rule established by 
the Department of Labor in its Interpretative Bulletin. 1so Specifi­
cally, the duration of disability benefits may be reduced: With re­
spect to disability benefits which occur at age 60 or less, by causing 
disability benefits to cease at age 65; and with respect to disabili­
ties which occur after age 60, by causing benefits to cease five 
years after disablement or at age 70, whichever occurs first. 
This pattern of benefits is referred to as a safe harbor. The 
Department of Labor will not require the employer to justify the 
termination of long-term disability payments on the basis of age re­
lated cost factors, if the employer adopts this alternative. 151 The 
safe harbor alternative was developed because the Department of 
Labor recognized the unfairness to employers of requiring long­
term disability benefits to continue until age 70. 152 Requiring pay­
ments until age 70 assumes that a worker who suffered a long-term 
disability would, in absence of a disability, work until age 70, even 
though the employee's entitlement to full retirement benefits be­
gins at an earlier age. Many, if not most, employees would have 
voluntarily left the work force prior to age 70 had they not become 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. 
150. [d. 
151. Id. 
152. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264, 43,266-67 (1978) (preamble to Proposed Interpreta­
tive Bulletin). 
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disabled. The safe harbor rule establishes an assumed probable re­
tirement age for employees who become disabled at various ages. 
In the preamble to the proposed Interpretative Bulletin, the De­
partment of Labor recognized that its safe harbor is subject to criti­
cism because it relies on age stereotypes. 153 
The fourth alternative is to reduce the duration of benefits to 
older employees based upon other patterns of benefits justified by 
age related cost data. 154 The preamble to the Interpretative Bulle­
tin gives the following example of the pattern of benefits estab­
lished by one insurer:155 
Duration of Benefits 
Age of Disablement (in years) 
61 or younger To age 65 
62 3% years 
63 3 
64 2% 
65 2 
66 1% 
67 1% 
68 IIf.a 
69 1 
The Department of Labor, however, did not endorse this pattern 
of disability benefits.15s Consequently, it or any other pattern es­
tablished by an employer or an insurance company still must be 
justified by age related cost data. 
There are significant differences in costs between the vari­
ous possible alternatives. Obviously, continuing long-term disabil­
ity benefits unreduced to age 70 is the most expensive alternative. 
While the Department of Labor's safe harbor alternative is less ex­
pensive, patterns of reduced benefits or reduced duration of bene­
fits offered by various insurance companies may represent the least 
costly alternatives. 
Another important cost saving measure is to have the long­
term disability plan offset benefits payable upon disability from 
other sources. This will serve to reduce the long-term benefits oth­
153. Id. at 43,267. 
154. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iii) (1979). 
155. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,655 (1979). This pattern was suggested by "the in­
surance company [Union Mutual] which provides group long-term disability insur­
ance to more employers than any other insurer in the United States." Id. 
156. Id. 
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erwise payable under the long-term disability policy. Other sources 
of replacement income which have traditionally been taken into ac­
count by long-term disability fplans are: Worker's compensation, so­
cial security disability and retirement benefits, veterans' pensions, 
employer's pension plan disability benefits, and individually pur­
. chased disability income policies. 157 Long-term disability plans typ­
ically pay large amounts of benefits over extended periods. Thus, 
integration of disability benefits with payments from other sources 
is important in order to avoid making the total of replacement in­
come benefits more attractive than an employee's normal earnings. 
As indicated, the Interpretative Bulletin permits integration with 
government paid benefits, provided that when government fi­
nanced benefits are included, older employees enjoy no less of a 
total benefit' than younger employees. 158 The preamble to the In­
terpretative Bulletin notes that the principle of integration applies 
to Medicare, social security disability and retirement benefits, and 
"other such government provided benefits. "159 Based on this,.it ap­
pears that long-term disability plans may continue to account for 
social security disability income benefits. Presumably, state work­
er's compensation disability benefits also may be included. The In­
terpretative Bulletin fails to consider whether disability benefits 
purchased by the employee may be taken into account. It also fails 
to consider whether a long-term disability plan may take into ac­
count social security retirement benefits as well as social security 
disability benefits. Since the Social Security Act only pays disability 
benefits until age 65 and pays retirement benefits after age 65, 
a long-term disability plan should be able to take into account so­
cial security retirement benefits. 160 
The most serious integration problem created by the Interpre­
tative Bulletin is coordination of employer sponsored retirement 
plan benefits with employer sponsored long-term disability bene­
fits. Traditionally, long-term disability benefits ceased at age 65 
when it was anticipated the employee would commence to receive 
employee retirement benefits. The Interpretative Bulletin, how­
ever, specifically rejects cessation of long-term disability benefits at 
age 65, unless justified by age related cost considerations, even 
157. D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119. 
158. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(e) (1979). 
159. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,652 (1979). 
160. Social Security Act, § 223(a)(I)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(I)(B) (1976). Might 
one argue that integrating Social Security retirement benefits wi¢ a disability plan 
violates the benefit by benefit rule? See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(2)(i) (1979). 
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if the employee commences to receive retirement benefits. 161 In­
stead, disability benefits often will be required to continue beyond 
age 65. The Interpretative Bulletin attempts to deal with the prob­
lem of over utilization of benefits which will occur if an employee 
can claim both disability benefits and retirement benefits concur­
rently. An obvious and undesirable moral hazard is created when­
ever total income replacement benefits approximate or exceed an 
individual's earnings. The Interpretative Bulletin takes the position 
that retirement benefits need not commence Jlntil disability bene­
fits cease. 162 This approach, however, has an ERISA related prob­
lem. Internal Revenue Code section 401(a)(14) and ERISA section 
206(a) provide that a participant in a pension plan, unless he or she 
elects otherwise, must commence to receive benefits no later than 
60 days after the later of the end of the plan year in which the par­
ticipant reaches normal retirement age or when the participant ter­
minates service with the employer. The Interpretative Bulletin 
provides, however, that an employee receiving long-term disability 
benefits may b'e deemed by the employer not to have "actually re­
tired," that is, terminated service. Therefore, benefits need not be 
paid simultaneously.163 This interpretation resolves the conflict be­
tween the Interpretative Bulletin and ERISA. Since the Wage and 
Hour Division of the Department of Labor has no authority to reg­
ulate ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code, however, its resolu­
tion of the conflict created by the Interpretative Bulletin remains 
open to question. 
Assuming this coordination of retirement and disability bene­
fits does not violate ERISA, qualified retirement plans could be 
amended to provide that retirement benefits will not commence 
until long-term disability benefits cease. 164 Long-term disability 
plans, in tum, might permit an employee to elect voluntarily to 
161. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iii) (1979). 
162. ld. at § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(6); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,656, 30,661 (1979) (pream­
ble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
163. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(6) (1979). This interpretation is inconsistent 
with the Department of Labor's ERISA regulation which requires employers to 
credit "hours of service" for eligibility, participation and vesting purposes under a 
pension benefit plan up to a maximum of 501 hours. Id: at § 2530.200b-2(a)(2)(i). 
164. Will the amendment of a qualified retirement plan to defer receipt of re­
tirement benefits until disability benefits cea~e cause an illegal forfeiture under 
I.R.C. § 411(a)(1O)? See Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-8(c) (1977) which prohibits indirect re­
ductions in vested benefits through amendments. See also·I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(B) on 
suspension of benefits upon the reemployment of a retiree. Was I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(B) 
intended to be the exclusive mle permitting suspensions? 
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terminate long-term disability benefits in order that retirement 
benefits might commence immediately at normal retirement age. 
An election to terminate long-term disability benefits would be ad­
vantageous to an employee whose monthly benefit under the quali­
fied retirement plan was greater than his or her monthly benefit 
under the long-term disability plan. 
There is a second alternative. Long-term disability benefits 
could be directly offset by the amount of retirement benefits re­
ceived under the quatified retirement plan. As indicated above, the 
offset of employee retirement benefits has been fairly common un­
der long-term disability plans. Although this offset approach does 
not avoid the need to make concurrent payments, it does eliminate 
the financial incentive to seek classification as a disabled employee 
at retirement plan. There is no tax: qualification problem, since the 
offset is applied to reduce benefits under the long-term disability 
plan and not the qualified retirement plan.165 The offset approach 
may, however, be in violation of the Interpretative Bulletin. There 
is a substantial argument that an offset in formula constitutes a 
benefit package approach and retirement plan benefits may not be 
coupled with other benefits under the benefit package approach. 166 
Many retirement plans pay long-term disability benefits if an 
employee becomes totally disabled prior to retirement date. As­
suming that the Interpretative Bulletin prohibits an offset of em­
ployee pension plan benefits, there appears to be no reason why 
disability benefits provided under the employer's retirement plan 
could not be offset under a benefit package approach. 167 
3. Health Insurance 
Although the cost of health insurance almost certainly varies 
by age, the Interpretative Bulletin does not offer any specific 
guidelines on reduction of health insurance benefits prior to age 
165. Rev. Rul. 578, 1971-2 C.B. 207 concludes that a qualified plan's disability 
retirement benefit may not be offset by a nonqualified disability benefit paid to the 
same employee. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) (1978) which requires contributions or bene­
fits in a qualified plan to bear a uniform relationship to compensation, but permits 
employer contributions to Social Security to be taken into account. Accord, Treas. 
Reg. § 1.401-4 (1963); Rev. Rul. 446, 1971-2 C.B. 187. 
166. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(ii) (1979). The author understands that the EEOC 
is reviewing the "offset" approach to determine whether to permit its use. 
167. Qualified pension and profit sharing plans are permitted to provide bene­
fits to a participant who becomes disabled. IRS PUBL. No. 778 pt. 5(m) (1972); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(ii) (1979). 
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65. 168 The preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin notes that 
because health insurance coverage does not ordinarily vary sig­
nificantly by age up to age 65 and because of the wide variety of 
health insurance plans currently marketed, the Department of La­
bor found it difficult to offer guidelines as to when reductions in 
coverage might be justified. 169 The Interpretative Bulletin simply 
states that health insurance benefit reductions may not be concen­
trated in certain items to make coverage less attractive for older 
workers.17o Reductions in health insurance, however, only may be 
justified under the benefit by benefit approach.l71 
The Department of Labor found that health insurance cover­
age often ceased at the mandatory retirement age of 65. Further­
more, even when coverage continued after age 65 it was reduced 
because of Medicare. 172 In view of the availability of Medicare 
starting at age 65, the Interpretative Bulletin takes the position 
that reductions in total health benefits, that is, Medicare plus em­
ployer sponsored health insurance benefits, for employees age 65 
to 70 generally are not justified. 173 Consequently, coordination of 
benefits with government sponsored health plans continues to be 
permissible. 
The insurance industry has developed two general approaches 
dealing with Medicare coverage. 174 First, the employer's health in­
168. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(f)(1), (2) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,654 (1979) 
(preamble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
169. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(l)(ii) (1979). Health insurance plans do not custom­
arily reduce benefit amounts paid to older workers, but do integrate benefits with 
Medicare. Consequently, the Department of Labor was unable to offer guidance on 
actuarially justified cost reductions in health insurance plans. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. at (f)(2)(iii). The prohibition on the use of the benefit package ap­
proach for health care benefits is based upon a statement by Representative Waxman 
(D., Cal.) that reductions in health benefits to older workers should not be made in 
"the absence of actuarial data which clearly demonstrates that the costs of this serv­
ice are uniquely burdensome to the employer." 124 CONGo REc. H2,227 (daily ed. 
Mar. 21, 1978), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,656 (1979) (preamble to the In­
terpretative Bulletin). 
172. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,653 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
See also D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 438. 
173. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(ii)(C) (1979). The Interpretative Bulletin how­
ever, does not preclude a reduction in total health care benefits for employees ages 
65 to 70. The burden is on the employer, however, to produce "sound and specific 
cost data to justify a reduction." 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,654 (1979). This appears to 
be stricter than the general standard requiring that costs be "valid and reasonable." 
See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(d)(1) (1979). 
174. S. HEUBNER & K. BLACK, supra note 119, at 224-25. 
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surance plan can "carve out" Medicare benefits. Under the "carve 
out" approach, health insurance plan benefits are directly offset by 
benefits paid under Medicare. 175 Employees over age 65 receive 
the same dollar amount of health insurance benefits from the 
health insurance plan and Medicare as employees under age 65 re­
ceive from the health insurance plan alone. 
Health insurance contracts utilizing the "carve out" approach 
contain a general exclusion of any expenses eligible for reimburse­
ment under Medicare or, in some contracts, an exclusion for ex­
penses actually reimbursed under Medicare. The distinction be­
tween excluding eligible Medicare expenses and actual Medicare 
expenses is significant because Part B of the federal Medicare 
law176 provides coverage for doctors' and surgeons' fees on an op­
tional basis requiring individual contributions towards the costs.177 
The second approach is to have the employer's health care 
plan supplement Medicare. A supplemental plan does not offset 
Medicare benefits, but rather, it is designed to cover specific ex­
penses not covered under Medicare. 178 Typically, a supplemental 
plan is a separate health insurance plan distinct from the employ­
er's regular medical plan. This separate plan supplements Medicare 
benefits payable to employees age 65 or older. Supplemental plans 
are designed to provide the same total medical benefits with Medi­
care as is provided to younger employees through the regular med­
ical plan. Since a supplemental plan anticipates which benefits 
Medicare will pay, it is possible that in certain instances employees 
over 65 might not receive the same total benefits as employees un­
der age 65.179 
The Interpreta~!ve Bulletin permits employers to coordinate 
their health plans with benefits provided by Medicare either by a 
"carve out" approach or by a supplemental plan approach. In 
175. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(f)(1)(ii)(A) (1979). 
176. Subchapter XVIII entitled, "Health Insurance for Aged and Disabled, Part 
B-Supplementing Medical Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled of the Social 
Security Act Amendments of 1965." 42 U.S.C. § 1395(j)-(w) (1976). 
177. [d. at § 1395(r). 
178. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(ii)(A) (1979). 
179. The preamble to the Interpretative Bulletin gives the following two exam­
ples: If Medicare pays less for professional services than was anticipated by the 
health insurer in designing the supplemental plan, the over age 65 employee will 
receive less total benefits. If prescription drugs are not covered under the regular 
health plan for employees of less than age 65 who are not covered by Medicare, but 
are covered by the supplemental plan for employees over age 65, then the over age 
65 employee will receive more total benefits. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,654 (1979). 
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response, however, to concerns that supplemental plans may not 
fully anticipate benefits not paid under Medicare, the Department 
of Labor places two conditions on the use of supplemental plans. 
First, the supplemental plan must cost the employer no less than a 
"carve out" plan would. Second, together with Medicare benefits, 
the supplemental plan must provide no less favorable benefits than 
a "carve out" plan. 180 As a practical matter, an employer will have 
difficulty demonstrating that he has satisfied both conditions. 18l 
These two conditions make the supplemental plan less desirable to 
employers than a "carve out" plan. 
The Interpretative Bulletin requires any employer sponsoring 
a health insurance plan which offsets Medicare benefits, including 
optional Part B benefits, to inform each eligible employee of the 
need to apply for Medicare coverage and to provide any necessary 
assistance in the application procedure. 182 Yet, the Interpretative 
Bulletin fails to indicate when and how notice of eligibility for 
Medicare Part B is to be given. 183 More importantly, employers 
may be required to subsidize fully or partially the employee costs 
for Medicare Part B. Specifically, when the health insurance plan 
requires no employee contribution or an employee contribution 
less than that required for Part B coverage,184 the employer must 
payor contribute towards the Part B cost to make the total benefits 
available on terms which are no less favorable for employees over 
65 than for employees under 65. 185 The employer's total contribu­
180. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(ii)(A) (1979). 
181. There is no standard "carve out" plan with standard costs with which to 
make a comparison. Costs among "carve out" plans vary from insurer to insurer. The 
costs of plans of the same insurer may also vary with the claims experience. Also, 
contract language is not uniform. Deductibles, maximums, coinsurance, exclusions 
and limitations vary. See D. GREGG & V. LUCAS, supra note 119, at 413-32. 
182. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(ii)(B) (1979). 
183. Is a general notice posted at a worksite sufficient or is individual notifica­
tion required? If individual notification is required may the disclosure be made as 
part of the summary plan description already required by ERISA? ERISA §§ 102, 
l04(b)(l)-(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024(b)(1)-(c) (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.102-2, -3, -4 
to .104b-2 (1979). How long prior to age 65 should the disclosure be made? How 
much assistance is required? 
184. As of July 1, 1979, Part B coverage cost each individual enrolled $8.70 per 
month; as of July 1, 1980 the cost will rise 90 cents to $9.60. Currently some 28 mil­
lion people have enrolled in Medicare Part "B." [1979] 1 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 
11 13, 847. 
185. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(ii)(B) (1979). Many health insurance plans provide 
coverage for dependents, including spouses. The Interpretative Bulletin fails to indi­
cate whether an employer is obligated to pay the spouse's Part B premium if the em­
ployer provides coverage for dependents. 
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tions for Part B in the health insurance plan, however, do not have 
to be greater than the employer's highest contribution for health 
benefits for employees of any age under 65. 186 
The Interpretative Bulletin's rule on Medicare Part B subsi­
dies is based on the general principle of equal benefits for employ­
ees. It may be possible, however, to have an integrated health care 
plan which satisfies section 4(f)(2) based on the equal cost unequal 
benefit principle.t87 An employer could establish an employer pay­
all health plan which is integrated with Medicare benefits. The em­
ployer agrees to pay the full cost of the health insurance premium 
plus all of the Medicare Part B. Under the equal cost principle, it 
should be possible to provide age related cost justified reduced 
coverage under the health insurance plan for the older employee. 
B. Application of Section 4(j)(2) to Retirement Plans 
Benefits provided under retirement plans188 are not subject to 
the otherwise uniform interpretation by the Department of Labor 
under section 4(f)(2) that age based reductions in employee bene-
Medicare Part B costs paid by the employer are excluded from the employees 
income. Rev. Rul. 67-360, 1967-2 C.B. 71. 
186. For example, assume the monthly employee contributions with no de­
pendents for group health insurance coverage for employees of a plan is $10. The 
employer monthly contribution for employees 65 years of age or older is $15. The 
employer's highest contribution for health insurance benefits for employees of any 
age under 65 is $20. The health care plan offsets Medicare benefits including Part B 
benefits. The monthly premium for Medicare Part B is $8.70. The Interpretative Bul­
letin requires the employer to pay both the group health insurance contribution for 
the employee age 65 years or older plus the Medicare Part B premium ($15 plus 
$8.70 or $23.70). The Interpretative Bulletin provides, however, that contributions 
for Part B in the health insurance plan do not have to be greater than the employer's 
highest contribution for health insurance benefits for employees of any age under 65 
(here $20). Thus, the employer will have to subsidize $5 of the $8.70 contribution for 
Medicare Part B ($20 - $15 = $5). 
187. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(2)(ii)(C) (1979); note 162 supra. 
188. Retirement plans include, but are apparently not limited to, retirement 
plans subject to title I of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1976). See 43 Fed. Reg. 
43,264, 43,267 (1978) (preamble to Proposed Interpretative Bulletin). ERISA § 3(2), 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976) defines employee pension benefit plan to include a plan 
sponsored by an employer which provides retirement income to employees, or re­
sults in the deferral of income by employees extending to termination of employ­
ment or beyond. As such, it includes both qualified retirement plans and non­
qualified deferred compensation plans. A qualified plan is a plan described in I.R.C. 
§§ 401-415 and includes pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, and annuity plans. 
ERISA further subdivides employee pension plans as being either defined contribu­
tion plans or defined benefit plans. ERISA §§ 3(34)-(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(35) 
(1976). The Interpretative Bulletin and this article separately considers defined con­
tribution and defined benefit plans. 
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fits must be justified by actuarially significant cost considera­
tions. 189 This departure from the equal cost or equal benefit princi­
ple is based on the legislative history of the 1978 amendments. 
Congress made it clear that the 1978 amendments would in no way 
interfere with the operation of relevant provisions of ERISA. 
ERISA, in effect, permits employers to stop pension credits at age 
65 or at the normal retirement date of the plan. 190 Specifically, 
Congress understood that the 1978 amendments would not change 
the definition of normal retirement age under ERISA.191 Further­
more, Congress understood that the 1978 amendments would not 
require the accrual of additional benefits or the payment of the ac­
tuarial equivalent of normal retirement benefits to employees who 
choose to work beyond normal retirement age. 
The EEOC is considering changes in the Department of La­
bor's rules for pension plans because it believes these rules create 
an employer windfall at the expense of employees working beyond 
age 65. The EEOC, however, may be reluctant to propose rule 
changes because such changes will cause conflicts with ERISA, are 
contrary to the legislative history of the 1978 amendments, and will 
be at odds with the Interpretative Bulletin in which the EEOC 
concurred. The changes being considered are more fully described 
below. 
1. Defined Benefit Plans 
The greatest cost differences with respect to age can be shown 
under a defined benefit pension plan. 192 Congress has already ac­
189. See 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,649 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulle­
tin). 
190. S. REp. supra note 112. See also Letter from Asst. Sec. of Labor for Em­
ployment Standards, Donald Elisburg to Senator Williams, reprinted in id. at 14-16. 
An identical letter was also sent to Congressman Hawkinsl This letter is reprinted in 
123 CONGo REe. H9977 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977). (hereinafter cited as the Elisburg 
letter). The Elisburg letter is the key document in the legislative history of the 1978 
amendments on the application of the amendments to defined benefit plans. The 
Elisburg letter was scrupulously followed by the Department of Labor in the Inter­
pretative Bulletin. The EEOC is now contemplating modification of the approaches 
set forth in the letter. See text accompanying notes 232-37 infra. 
191. S. REP. supra note 112, at 5; Elisburg letter, supra note 190. 
192. A defined benefit plan is a pension plan which specifies the retirement 
benefits payable or the method of determining the benefits but not the employer 
contributions. For example, a defined benefit plan may promise a specified amount 
per month at retirement (flat benefit), a stated percentage of compensation (a fixed 
benefit), or a stated percentage of compensation times years of service (unit benefit). 
See ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1976); I.R.C. § 414(j). Employer contribu­
tions under a defined benefit plan are determined actuarially on the basis of the re­
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knowledged the unfairness of requiring employers to fund the high 
cost of benefits for employees hired at older ages as part of ERISA. 
Under ERISA, there is an exemption from the minimum participa­
tion requirements permitting employers to exclude from defined 
benefit pension plans or from target benefit pension plans any em­
ployee hired at an age less than five years prior to normal retire­
ment age. 193 Similarly, ERISA is sensitive to employer costs for 
older employees under its minimum vesting rules. While ERISA 
requires full vesting for employees who reach normal retirement 
age,194 normal retirement age for vesting purposes is defined as 
the earlier of (1) the normal retirement age specified under the 
plan, (2) age 65 or (3) the tenth anniversary of the beginning of par­
ticipation. 195 Consequently, ERISA permits plans to delay full 
vesting for employees who begin participation after age 55 for a 
ten-year period. 
Finally, ERISA provides for three alternative minimum ac­
crued benefit methods. Two methods, the 1331f:J% and the frac­
tional methods, permit, but do not require, accruals to cease at 
normal retirement age. 196 The third, the 3% method, requires ac­
cruals to continue during active employment, including years after 
197normal retirement age, up to a maximum of 331f:J years. 
Since there is no explicit statutory statement of the equal cost 
or equal benefit principle, the legislative history becomes of critical 
importance when judging whether defined benefit plans discrimi­
nate against older employees because their benefits cannot be jus­
tified by age related cost considerations. The most significant as­
pect of the legislative history is a letter from Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for Employment Standards Donald Elisburg to Congressman 
Augustus Hawkins and Senator Harrison Williams. This letter in­
terpreted the 1978 amendments as not conflicting with ERISA 
rules governing defined benefit plans. 198 
tirement benefits expected to become payable. ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082 
(1976); I.R.C. § 412. 
193. ERISA § 202(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2) (1976): I.R.C. § 410(a)(2); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.410(a)-4(a)(1) (1979). 
194. ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.411 
(a)-l(a)(l) (1979). 
195. ERISA § 3(24),29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(8); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.411(a)-7(b) (1979). 
196. ERISA § 204(b)(1)(B)-(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(B)-(C) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(b) 
(l)(B)-(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)-1(b)(2)(ii)(E)-(3)(ii)(C) (1979). 
197. ERISA § 204(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § lO54(b)(l)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 411 
(b)(l)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)-1(b)(1)(i) (1979). 
198. See note 190 supra. The letter was provided by Elisburg in response to 
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The Elisberg letter was incorporated into the Senate Com­
mittee Report and the Congressional Record as part of the legisla­
tive history.199 Furthermore, both the House and Senate Commit­
tee Reports contain statements of legislative intent which express 
the same view of the 1978 amendments as is expressed in the 
Elisberg letter.2oo In particular, the Elisberg letter provided: (1) 
Employers need not credit years of service for purposes of benefit 
accrual after normal retirement age; (2) employers are not required 
to pay the actuarial equivalent of normal retirement benefits to an 
employee who continues to work beyond normal retirement age; 
(3) retirement benefits can be deferred after normal retirement age 
until actual retirement; (4) an increase in the upper age limit of the 
protected group to 70 will not increase funding costs for pension 
plans; and (5) the failure to provide benefit accruals for employees 
who remain employed after normal retirement age will not consti­
tute age discrimination under the AD EA. 201 
The Interpretative Bulletin harmonizes its rules with the re­
quirements of ERISA and the legislative history of the 1978 
amendments. Under the Department of Labor's Interpretative Bul­
letin, there are five basic rules regarding plan participants who 
continue in employment after having attained the normal retire­
ment age specified in the plan. 
First, defined benefit plans are not required to credit for pur­
poses of benefit accrual those years of service which occur after an 
employee has attained the normal retirement age specified in the 
plan. 202 Second, plans are not required to pay the actuarial equiva­
lent of normal retirement benefits to an employee who continues 
to work beyond the normal retirement age specified in the plan. 203 
Third, all variables used in computing the accrued benefit of an 
employee may be frozen at normal retirement age. Specifically, 
five questions posed by the Senate Committee which was clearly concerned about 
potential conflict with ERISA. Letter from Senators Williams & Javits to Donald 
Elisburg, Asst. Sec. of Labor (Aug. 29, 1977), reprinted in S. REP. supra note 112 at 
13-14. 
199. See note 187 supra. 
200. H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977); S. REP. supra note 112 
at 5. 
201. Elisburg letter, supra note 190. 
202. 29 C.F.R. § 860. 120(f)( 1)(iv)(B)(3), (5) (1979). 
203. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(4) (1979). Neither ERISA nor the I.R.C. re­
quires a defined benefit plan to actuarially adjust upwards benefits for employees 
who work beyond a plan's normal retirement date. See Treas. Reg. § 1.4U(c)-1(f)(2) 
( 1979). 
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plans may disregard salary increases and benefit improvements oc­
curring after normal retirement age for employees working beyond 
that age. 204 While a defined benefit does not have to consider com­
pensation increases in benefit changes after a person reaches nor­
mal'retirement date, the plan must assure that employees who 
continue to work beyond normal retirement age are treated as well 
as similarly situated employees who retire. Thus, if a benefit im­
provement is given to retirees, such as a cost of living adjustment, 
the plan must give the same benefit improvement to employees 
who continue to work beyond normal retirement age. 205 Similarly, 
defined benefit plans with social security offset formulas, which do 
not continue to accrue benefits for service after normal retirement 
age or which do not provide benefit improvements to employees 
working beyond normal retirement age, must freeze the amount of 
social security offset at the time benefit accruals ceased. 206 Thus, if 
years of service or benefit accruals in a benefit formula are frozen 
because of age at normal retirement age, the social security offset 
must also be frozen at the same age. 207 Social security retirement 
benefits are indexed to reflect increases in average wages. 208 The 
204. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(7) (1979). The proposed Interpretative Bul­
letin was silent on this point. The final Interpretative Bulletin permits salary and 
benefit improvements to be frozen at normal retirement age because "[tlhe 1978 leg­
islative history indicates an understanding that no adjustment to an accrued benefit 
under a defined benefit plan is required on account of employment after normal re­
tirement age." 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,656 (1979) (emphasis added). Defined benefit 
plans promise to pay a stated benefit at normal retirement age. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1978). This stated benefit is called the normal form of benefit and 
is usually expressed as a single life annuity. In addition, most plans permit the par­
ticipant to elect optional forms of benefits of equal value, but different in amount. 
For example, a married participant must be offered a joint and survivor annuity as 
the standard form of benefit, unless the participant elects otherwise. ERISA § 205, 
29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(1l); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-1l (1979). Other 
common optional forms of benefits include a life annuity certain (an annuity payable 
for a specified period, such as 5 or 10 years, and after that as long as the participant 
lives); a modified cash refund life annuity (an annuity payable for life with an agree­
ment to pay a lump sum to the beneficiary in an amount by which the employee pro­
vided accrued benefit exceeds the payments made to the employee); and a cash, one 
sum payment. The quoted statement in the preamble suggests that optional forms 
may be frozen as well as the normal form. For example, if a participant were entitled 
to elect a $10,000 cash one sum payment at normal retirement age, the participant is 
also entitled to elect a $10,000 cash one sum payment at a deferred retirement date. 
205. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(7) (1974); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,656 
(1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
206. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(8) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,656 
(1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
207. See note 206 supra. 
208. Social Security Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 415 (West Cum. 
Supp. 1979). 
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Interpretative Bulletin prevents the employer from taking into ac­
count any increases in social security benefits to diminish the bene­
fits paid by the employer under the defined benefit plan. ERISA 
already prevents plans from considering social security increases 
after an employee's separation from service. 209 Freezing the social 
security offset at normal retirement date assures equal treatment 
for employees who continue in employment. They will receive the 
same dollar benefit upon retirement as a similarly situated em­
ployee who retired at normal retirement age. 
Fourth, any employee hired less than five years prior to nor­
mal retirement age may be excluded from the defined benefit plan, 
and any employee hired after normal retirement age may be ex­
cluded from a defined benefit plan. 210 Fifth, a defined benefit plan 
may provide, for employees who work beyond normal retirement 
age, that retirement benefits will commence at the actual date of 
retirement rather than at normal retirement age. 211 Specifically, 
employers receiving long-term disability benefits as salary replace­
ment may be deemed not to have "actually retired." Therefore, 
they need not be simultaneously provided with retirement bene­
fits.212 This interpretation attempts to resolve the problem of con­
current payment of long-term disability benefits and retirement 
213benefits to employees who have reached normal retirement age.
In summary, the Interpretative Bulletin permits a defined benefit 
plan to pay at deferred retirement the same amount of monthly 
benefit to which an employee was entitled at normal retirement 
date. 
209. ERISA § 206(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(b) (1979); I.R.C. § 401(a)(15); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.401(a)-(15) (1979). 
210. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iv)(A) (1979). All defined benefit plans, whether 
or not subject to ERISA, may exclude employees hired within five years of normal 
retirement age. Defined benefit plans, not subject to ERISA, may exclude employees 
hired more than five years prior to normal retirement age if the exclusion "is justifia­
ble on the basis of cost considerations." Id. Plans subject to ERISA are prohibited 
from excluding employees hired at earlier ages. See note 193 supra. 
211. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iv)(6) (1979). ERISA permits commencement of 
benefits to be delayed after normal retirement age until a later terminiation of serv­
ice. ERISA § 206(a) 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(14); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.401(a)-14(a)(3) (1979). ERISA similarly provides that benefits may be suspended 
upon the reemployment of a retiree. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B) 
(1976); IRL § 411(a)(3)(B): 43 Fed. Reg. 59,098 (1978) (proposed Department of La­
bor regulations) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 2530.203-3). The Internal Revenue 
Service also allows plans to pay retirement benefits while an employee continues to 
work after normal retirement age. Rev. Rul. 71-24, 1971-1 C.B. 114. 
212. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iv)(6) (1979). 
213. See text accompanying notes 161-167 supra. 
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While many of the Interpretative Bulletin's rules have the ef­
fect of increasing employer costs to fund plans, the rules relating to 
defined benefit plans do not increase costs. In many cases, plan 
costs may be lowered. 214 The higher the retirement age, the lower 
the cost of a given amount of retirement benefit will be. For exam­
ple, if an employee elects a deferred retirement at age 70 rather 
than at the normal retirement age of 65, there is an additional five­
year period during which the employee may die. The resulting 
possibility is that he or she will never receive benefits. In addition, 
retirement at age 70 reduces the length of the benefit period dur­
ing which retirement benefits are paid. Finally, since the plan is 
not required to provide for additional accrual of benefits after the 
participant has reached the plan's normal retirement age, the par­
ticipant's added years of service between ages 65 and 70 will not 
increase the ultimate retirement benefit paid or the cost of provid­
ing it. 
When employers decide to provide deferred retirement bene­
fits which are more favorable than the benefits required by the In­
terpretative Bulletin, plan costs may not be less. There are essen­
tially four different methods of handling benefits after age 65. The 
four options are outlined in rough order of increasing cost. First, 
the benefit level could be frozen at normal retirement age. Thus, 
an employee would receive the same dollar benefit he or she 
had earned at normal retirement age. This would be true regardless 
of how much later he or she actually retired. Second, the benefit 
could be changed to reflect salary increases, but with no additional 
credits for service after normal retirement age. Third, the deferred 
retirement benefit could be increased to reflect service credits as 
well as salary and social security increases. Fourth, the deferred 
retirement benefit could be actuarially increased. 215 
214. The Elisburg letter, supra note 190, addressed the cost issue: 
An increase in the upper age limit of the ADEA would not increase the 
funding costs for private pension plans. As a matter of fact, financial pres­
sure on private pension plans could be alleviated. Requiring an employer to 
permit a qualified employee to work until the Act's upper age limit, regard­
less of the pension plan's normal retirement age, would result in cost sav­
ings to plans rather than increases. 
Id., reprinted in S. REP. supra note 112 at 15-16. 
The employer cost savings as a result of the 1978 amendments disturbs EEOC 
Assistant Commissioner Leach who perceives the cost savings to be at the expense 
of older workers. See note 7 supra: text accompanying notes 232-37 infra. 
215. Perrins, Foster & Crosby, actuarial consultants, conducted a survey of 60 
New England companies during the week of June 4, 1979. This survey revealed that 
65% of all employers intended a total freeze of accrued benefits at normal retirement 
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The EEOC is actively considering changes in the Department 
of Labor's rules for defined benefit plans. 216 The EEOC is consid­
ering requiring continued accruals for employees in a plan whose 
benefits are not fully accrued by the time the employees reach the 
plan's normal retirement age. The EEOC is also considering re­
quiring the payment of the actuarial equivalent of a normal retire­
ment benefit to an employee who works beyond normal retirement 
age. Finally, the EEOC is considering requiring that increases in 
compensation and benefit improvements accruing after normal re­
tirement age be taken into account when calculating a deferred re­
tirement benefit. 
The contemplated changes all conflict with the express legisla­
tive history of the 1978 amendments. 217 The EEOC, however, be­
lieves that the changes are justified by the general rule that age 
based reductions must be justified under ADEA by actuarially sig­
nificant cost consideration. 218 
The EEOC position deserves examination. The actuarially sig­
nificant test is derived from the Department of Labor's original 
interpretation in 1969 requiring that all employer benefit plans 
provide equal benefits or demonstrate that differential benefits 
have equal costS. 219 The unequal benefit equal cost half of the prin­
ciple was further refined by the Department of Labor in its 1979 
Interpretative Bulletin. It required the data used to demonstrate 
equal cost to be cost data in which age is an actuarially significant 
factor. The EEOC neglects the other half of the principle: equal 
benefit unequal cost. A defined benefit plan which pays the same 
dollar amount of monthly benefit at deferred retirement date as is 
paid at normal retirement date can be justified because of the 
equal benefit alternative. Reliance on the equal cost alternative is 
date; seven percent will adjust the accrued benefit at normal retirement date for sub­
sequent changes in earnings, but not for subsequent service; seventeen percent will 
continue to accrue benefits based on both earnings and service after normal retire­
ment date; three percent will increase accrued benefits at normal retirement date by 
a fixed percentage for each year of delayed retirement or by a factor based on actua­
rial equivalents; three percent will adjust accrued benefits at normal retirement date 
for continued service, but not for changes in earnings; and five percent of employers 
were uncertain or did not answer the question. Letter from A. Norman Crowder, III, 
Vice President, Towers, Perrins, Foster & Crosby, Boston Massachusetts to the au­
thor (Sept. 10, 1979). 
216. EEOC Vice Chairman, Daniel E. Leach discussed what changes are con­
templated in a recent speech. See note 7 supra. 
217. See text accompanying notes 198-201 supra. 
218. Leach's Speech, supra note 7. 
219. Id. 
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unnecessary. Contrary to the EEOC's position, freezing benefits at 
normal retirement age is consistent with the Department of La­
bor's historical position of equal benefits or equal costs. 
Another point deserves consideration. The equal cost or equal 
benefit principle is not a clearly established legal interpretation of 
ADEA's section 4(f)(2).220 Equal cost or equal benefits is the De­
partment of Labor's interpretation of the meaning of the word "sub­
terfuge" in section 4(£)(2). There is no express statutory authority 
for, or an explicit statement of, the equal cost or equal benefit 
principle in the legislative history of the ADEA. The principle has 
been implied by the Department of Labor from a rather ambiguous 
legislative history, and its interpretation has been rejected by sev­
eral federal courts including the Supreme Court in the McMann 221 
decision. 
In summary, the Department of Labor in its Interpretative 
Bulletin has faithfully followed· the legislative history of the 1978 
amendments with respect to qualified defined benefit plans. Its 
rules permit accrued benefits to be frozen at normal retirement 
age. The EEOC is now contemplating a revision of the rules for 
defined benefit plans to require increases in benefits for employees 
who defer retirement beyond the normal retirement date. The 
EEOC's contemplated revision repudiates the legislative history of 
the 1978 amendments and overturns a prior final Interpretative 
Bulletin of the Department of Labor. Under the Skidmore stan­
dard, an EEOC guideline is judged on "the thoroughness evi­
dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis­
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. "222 
The EEOC contemplated revision "does not fare well under these 
standards. "223 
2. Defined Contribution Plans 
The Interpretative Bulletin again follows the legislative history 
of the 1978 amendments. 224 It states that some, but not all, de­
220. See note 2 supra. 
221. 434 u.s. at 192. See notes 20-22 supra for the history of the equal cost or 
equal benefit principle. 
222. 323 U.S. at 140. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra. 
223. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976). 
224. Senator Javits (R. N.Y.) made the following statement with which Senator 
Williams 	(D. N.J.) concurred: 
[Aln employer will be permitted under the act, as amended, to maintain a 
defined contribution plan-other than a plan which is merely supplemental 
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fined contribution plans may provide for the cessation of employer 
contributions after normal retirement age and excludes from partic­
ipation employees at normal retirement age or older.225 Specifi­
cally, any defined contribution plan which is not supplemental is 
not required to make additional allocations to employees who re­
main employed after normal retirement date. A supplemental de­
fined contribution plan, on the other hand, may not provide for the 
cessation of employer contributions after normal retirement age. 226 
Thus, the definition of "supplemental" becomes critical to a 
determination of whether or not employer contributions are re­
quired to continue under a defined contribution plan after normal 
retirement age. The Interpretative Bulletin adopts a mechanical 
approach. A defined contribution plan is supplemental with respect 
to any employee if an employee participates in both a defined ben­
efit plan and a defined contribution plan. 227 When an employer has 
no defined benefit plans, but two or more defined contribution 
plans, all but one of the defined contribution plans are supplemen­
tal with respect to employees covered by all. The employer has 
the right to designate which of these plans is not supplemental. 228 
If the employer sponsors only one defined contribution plan, the 
one plan is nonsupplemental. 229 The test is applied on an em-
to a defined benefit or defined contribution plan maintained by the 
employer-which precludes employer and, if applicable, employee contribu­
tions to such plan subsequent to an employee's attainment of the plan's nor­
mal retirement age. 
124 CONGo REC. S4450 (daily ed. March 23, 1978). In the House, a substantially 
identical statement was made by Congressman Dent (D. Pa.) with which Congress­
man Hawkins (D. Cal.) concurred. 124 CONGo REC. H2271 (daily ed. March 21, 
1978). While the Elisburg letter, supra note 190, is not directly on point since it ap­
pears only to address the issues relating to qualified defined benefit plans, it is rea­
sonable to assume that both the Department of Labor and Congress intended de­
fined contribution plans to receive parallel treatment with defined benefit plans. See 
Address by Stephen J. Sacher, Special Counsel to Senate Human Resources Com­
mittee, on the legislative history of the 1978 Age Act Amendments, Sept. 18, 1978, 
reprinted in [1978] PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 207, at R-4 (Sept. 25, 1978). See also 43 
Fed. Reg. 43,265, 43,267-68 (1978) (preamble to proposed Interpretative Bulletin). 
225. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(1) (1979). 
226. [d. 
227. [d. For a number of legitimate reasons an employer may use a combina­
tion of plans rather than one plan to provide retirement benefits. The total contribu­
tions and benefits that can be provided to anyone employee, however, is limited by 
I.R.C. § 415. See 45 Fed. Reg. 5754-80 (1980) (proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.415). Under 
the Interpretative Bulletin, if an employee is a participant in a defined benefit plan 
and a profit-sharing plan, the profit-sharing plan is a supplemental plan. 
228. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(1)(iv)(B)(1) (1979). 
229. [d. 
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ployee by employee basis. Specifically, a defined contribution plan 
is considered supplemental as to any given employee, only if an­
other plan covers that same employee. 230 
230. Id; 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,655 (1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulle­
tin). This qualification permits an employer to sponsor two plans for different groups 
of employees, such as union and nonunion, or salaried and hourly, without requiring 
one plan to be "supplemental." 
The Department of Labor left unresolved the status of floor plan arrangements 
and target benefit plans. A floor plan arrangement is a defined benefit plan which is 
designed to provide a floor or minimum benefit. The normal retirement benefit paya­
ble under the defined benefit plan is offset by the benefit provided under a separate, 
but related profit sharing plan. Under the floor plan arrangement, if the profit 
sharing plan fails to provide an amount of retirement benefit equal to the floor level 
promised under the defined benefit plan, the defined benefit pension plan will make 
up the difference. On the other hand, if the profit sharing provides a normal retire­
ment benefit in excess of the floor level, all benefits will be provided under the 
profit sharing plan. See Rev. Rul. 259, 1976-2 C.B. Ill. The Department of Labor 
was asked to decide whether a floor plan arrangement is one or two plans. If viewed 
as a single plan, the profit sharing component could cease contributions at normal re­
tirement date. If viewed as two plans, two differing results are possible. 
One possibility is that the defined benefit plan be viewed as a supplemental 
plan in which case the profit sharing plan could cease contributions at normal retire­
ment date. The other possibility and the result imposed by the literal meaning of the 
Interpretative Bulletin, is that the floor plan arrangement does constitute two plans, 
and the profit sharing plan, as a defined contribution plan covering the same em­
ployees as a defined benefit plan, is supplemental with the result that contributions 
to the profit sharing plan must continue after normal retirement date. 
The Department of Labor also refused to indicate how target benefit plans 
should be treated under the Interpretative Bulletin. The target benefit plan is a hy­
brid defined benefit/defined contribution plan. Under ERISA, a target benefit plan is 
a defined contribution plan, but it is given defined benefit plan treatment for pur­
poses of the maximum age exclusion. See I.R.C. §§ 41O(a)(2), 414(i), 415(c); Rev. Rul. 
464, 1976-2 C.B. 115. A target benefit plan obligates an employer to make a level 
contribution each year on behalf of an employee necessary to provide an assumed or 
target benefit at normal retirement date. The contributions are allocated to an indi­
vidual account for each employee. If the earnings of the plan are above the assumed 
investment rate made in calculating the contribution, the participant will receive a 
benefit at normal retirement in excess of the target benefit. On the other hand, if the 
actual rate of return to the plan is less than the assumed rate of return, the partici­
pant will receive a retirement benefit which is less than the target benefit. Historic­
ally, the informal position of the IRS National Office has been that a target benefit 
plan is a defined contribution plan for purposes of determining whether prohibited 
discrimination in favor of officers, shareholders or highly compensated employees has 
occurred. As a result of this position, the IRS National Office has required that con­
tributions to a target benefit plan cease at normal retirement date. The preamble to 
the Interpretative Bulletin states that defined contribution plan is synonymous with 
individual account plan. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,655 (1979). Since a target benefit 
plan is an individual account plan, one may assume that the. Interpretative Bulletin 
requires supplemental target benefit plans to continue contributions after normal re­
tirement date. Thus, there appears to be a conflict in policy between the Interpreta­
tive Bulletin and the informal position of the Internal Revenue Service with regard 
to the continuation of contributions after normal retirement date under target benefit 
plans. 
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The Interpretative Bulletin also requires that investment gains 
and losses and employee termination forfeitures be available on the 
same basis to employees after normal retirement age as they are 
available to younger employees. This is true whether or not the 
defined contribution plan is supplemental. 231 Thus, it is improper 
to freeze the value of the participant's individual account as of his 
or her normal retirement age. The account must continue to be 
credited with investment gains and losses. In the case of a profit 
sharing plan, the account must be credited with any employee ter­
mination forfeitures which are reallocated to the remaining partici­
pants. 
The EEOC is contemplating requiring all defined contribution 
plans to continue contributions after an employee reaches normal 
retirement age. 232 While conflicting with the legislative history, 233 
requiring continued contributions would result in a less drastic 
restructuring of existing plans than would a requirement for contin­
ued accruals in defined benefit plans. In fact, many defined contri­
bution plans already continue contributions after normal retirement 
age. 234 Furthermore, while the cessation of benefit accruals in a 
defined benefit plan can be justified as avoiding an employer cost 
which is directly related to age, no similar age related justification 
exists for a defined contribution plan. In' the typical defined contri­
bution plan, the contribution is a percentage of the participant's 
salary; the participant's age is immaterial. 
Under ERISA, there is some dispute as to whether contribu­
tions may cease at normal retirement age if a participant continues 
to work. The parallel minimum participation standards of ERISA 
and the Internal Revenue Code can be interpreted as requiring 
231. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(f)(I)(iv)(B)(2) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,655-56 
(1979) (preamble to Interpretative Bulletin). 
232. Leach's speech, supra note 7, although advocating modification of the de­
fined benefit rules also appears to propose revision of the defined contribution rules. 
Thus, Leach urged "[W]ould it not be more equitable to carry forward the 'equal 
cost' principle and simply require contributions, or credit all post-normal retirement 
service for purposes of benefit accrual." (emphasis added). The EEOC staff has more 
clearly indicated its intent to revise the defined contribution rules. See, e.g., 
Huffman, supra note 7, at 1. 
233. See note 224 supra. 
234. For example, financial institutions may offer to employers "master" and 
"prototype" plans which have been approved as to form by the IRS Na­
tional Office. See Rev. Proc. 8, 1972-1 C.B. 716. The IRS National Office insists 
that master and prototype money purchase pension plans and profit sharing plans 
continue contributions after normal retirement date. See IRS Form M-0161 (10177) 
(Defined Contribution, Corporate Listing of Required Modifications Document Pro­
visions 22 & 23). 
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continued contributions. Specifically, the minimum participation stan­
dards contain an express exclusion from participation for persons 
hired within five years of normal retirement age in a defined bene­
fit or target benefit plan. There is no exclusion for participation 
from defined contribution plans. 235 Arguably, the failure to exclude 
employees from participation requires continued accruals. If this 
position is correct, then the Interpretative Bulletin's rule for 
nonsupplemental plans contravenes ERISA. 
A counterargument, however, is that participation is not syn­
onymous with benefit accrual. 236 While an employee is entitled 
after normal retirement age to continue as a participant, he or she 
may not be entitled to receive employer contributions. 237 As a par­
ticipant, his or her account would continue to share in investment 
and experience gains and losses. Furthermore, the participant 
would be entitled to exercise rights under title I of ERISA: To ex­
amine plan documents, to receive disclosure materials and to sue 
in federal courts. 
3. Involuntary Retirement 
Retirement plans have customarily required involuntary retire­
ment when an employee reaches the plan's normal retirement age. 
Section 4(£)(2) of the ADEA, however, now prohibits involuntary 
retirement because of age. Specifically, section 4(£)(2) states: "[N]o 
such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or 
permit the involuntary retirement of any individual ... because of 
the age of such individual. "238 
Many retirement plans still contain normal retirement provi­
sions which permit or require involuntary retirement of an em­
ployee at normal retirement age, usually at 65. Many plans also 
235. ERISA § 202(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2) (1976); l.R.C. § 41O(A)(2); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.401(a)-4 (1979). 
236. ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 2530.204-1-.204-3; 
l.R.C. § 411(a)(7), (b); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)-1(a) (1979). Prior to ERISA, the Internal 
Revenue Service permitted employer contributions to cease at normal retirement age 
under a money purchase pension plan. See Rev. Rul. 73-448, 1973-2 C.B. 136. At the 
same time the Internal Revenue Service also permitted employer contributions to 
continue after normal retirement age under a profit-sharing plan. See Rev. Rul. 
69-414, 1969-2 C.B. 59; See also IRS Publ. 778 (2172) (Guidelines for Qualification of 
Pension, Profit-Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans, Part 5(g)). 
237. How convincing is it to hire an employee who is older than the normal re­
tirement age, classify him as a participant, but credit his individual account with no 
contributions or reallocated forfeitures? 
238. 29 U.S.C.A. § 603(f)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 
623(f)(2) (1976)). 
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contain deferred retirement provisions which permit continued em­
ployment after normal retirement age only with employer consent. 
Such provisions must be amended. 
Incorporating employment practices into the provisions of em­
ployee benefit plans has been commonplace. This practice, how­
ever, no longer seems desirable. While the commencement of 
retirement benefits will often coincide with termination of employ­
ment, the entitlement to retirement benefits can no longer be used 
to determine employment statuS. 239 In light of the 1978 amend­
ments, separate treatment of retirement benefits and personnel 
practices seems preferable. While a plan's normal retirement age 
can no longer be the employer's age of mandatory retirement, nor­
mal retirement age continues to be needed for purposes of 
determining retirement benefits. 240 Consequently, plan provisions 
must continue to define normal retirement age,241 but should avoid 
any suggestion that reaching normal retirement age requires a ter­
mination of employment. 
The legislative history of the 1978 amendments clearly permits 
an employer to select a normal retirement age of less than 70. 242 
One unresolved issue, however, is whether an employer may 
choose an unusually low normal retirement age. Under ERISA and 
the Internal Revenue Code, it is permissible for an employer to se­
lect a normal retirement age earlier than 65. 243 There are legiti­
mate reasons other than costs for lowering the normal retirement 
239. See 44 Fed. Reg. 68,860, 68,862 (1979) (proposed EEOC interpretation) (to 
be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1635.9). 
240. Normal retirement age is the time in which definitely determinable bene­
fits under a qualified pension plan became fixed and payable, the participant is 
100% vested in his accrued benefit. I.R.C. § 411(a). Under the 133 1(3% and the frac­
tional rules for accrued benefits, accruals in qualified defined benefit plans cease at 
normal retirement age. I.R.C. § 411(b)(I)(B), (C); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)(2)(ii)(E), 
.4U(b)(3)(ii)(C) (1979). A participant's right to elect out of a qualified joint and sur­
vivor annuity and into an early survivor annuity is measured from normal retire­
ment age. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(B), (C); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)11(a)(I)(i), -11(b)(5), and 
-11(c)(I)(2) (1979). Finally, a participant must be permitted to retire and to com­
mence to receive benefits within 60 days after the end of the plan year in which he 
reaches normal retirement age. I.R.C. § 401(a)(14)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-14(a)(l) 
(1979). 
241. I.R.C. § 411(a)(8); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(b) (1979). 
242. S. REP., supra note 112, at 5; Elisburg letter, supra note 190. 
243. Rev. Rul. 120, 1978-1 C.B. 117 (a plan may specify any age that is less 
than 65 as the normal retirement age). But see Rev. Rul. 331, 1978-2 C.B. 158, 
which indicates that an early normal retirement age in a defined benefit plan which 
would otherwise increase the employer's deductible contribution will have to be ig­
nored for funding purposes if employees do not, in fact, retire at the age specified. 
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age. 244 Lowering the normal retirement age, however, results in 
lower benefit costs, at the expense of older workers. This happens 
because employer contributions and benefit accruals can stop after 
normal retirement age. The Department of Labor noted in the pre­
amble to its proposed Interpretative Bulletin that it would "scruti­
nize carefully as a potential subterfuge" any unusually low normal 
retirement age. 245 The statement was deleted without comment in 
the final version. 
Since normal retirement age can no longer be used to termi­
nate older employees, it is imperative for employers to develop 
satisfactory performance appraisal systems. While it is true that 
mandatory retirement at normal retirement age forces some com­
petent employees out of work, it is also true that mandatory retire­
ment provided a graceful means of forcing out older employees 
who were no longer competent. 246 Perhaps the most serious prob­
244. A lower normal retirement age will increase the employer's deductible 
contribution to a defined benefit plan. But see Rev. Rul. 78-331, 1978-2 C.B. 158. 
A lower normal retirement age can also increase the value of the benefit paid to 
a highly compensated employee under a defined benefit plan. l.R.C. § 415(b)(1) es­
tablishes a maximum annual benefit payable to any participant under a defined ben­
efit plan of the lesser of: (i) 100% of the participant's average compensation in his 
high three consecutive years of employment while he was an active participant, or 
(ii) $75,000 (adjusted each year for cost of living increases, effective Jan. 1, 1980 to 
$110,625. 3 PEN. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 'if 17,172 at 20,282 (IRS News Release 80-10, 
Feb. 5, 1980)). I.R.C. § 415(b)(2)(C) requires a downward adjustment in the value of 
the annual benefit where the benefit begins before age 55. See Rev. Rul. 75-481 
§ 3.04, 1975-2 C.B. 188. The present value of a maximum annual benefit (i.e., a 
single life annuity) commencing at age 55 is greater than the present value of a maxi­
mum annual benefit commencing at age 65. Consequently, a normal retirement age 
of 55 permits a larger one sum cash distribution option than a normal retirement age 
of 65. See Burrows, Maximum Benefits and Contributions in Small Corporate Re­
tirement Plans Without Violating Section 415, 5 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 311, 
323-24 (1979). 
245. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,264, 43,267 (1978). 
246.. 29 C.F.R. §§ 103(f), 860.104(b) (1968) (Department of Labor regulations); 
44 Fed. Reg. 68,858, 68,861 (1979) (proposed EEOC regulation) (to be codified in 29 
C.F.R. § 1625.7). The majority of courts have permitted a discharge in connection 
with a reduction in force based upon evaluation of performance and ability as com­
pared to other employees to perform the work remaining. Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 
398 F. Supp. 579 (D. D.C. 1974); Billingsley v. Service Technology Corp., 6 Fair 
Empl. Prac. 404, 410 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp. 
364, 366 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp. 1175, 
1181-82 (W.D. Ark. 1970). Similarly a discharge of an older employee can be based 
upon inadequate performance. Surrissi v. Conwed Corp., 510 F.2d 1088, 1090 (8th 
Cir. 1975); Cowlishaw v. Armstong Rubber Co., 450 F. Supp. 148 (E.D.N.)' 1978); 
Bittar v. Air Canada, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. 1136, 1137 (S.D. Fla. 1974), affd, 512 F.2d 
582 (5th Cir. 1975); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 586-88 (D.D.C. 
1974); Brennan v. Reynolds Co., 367 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Periodic 
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lem for employers is to establish workable criteria to fire older em­
ployees who are no longer physically or mentally capable of doing 
their jobs. 247 
4. 	 Involuntary Retirement-Exception for Executive 

and High Policymaking Employees 

Although the 1978 amendments generally prohibit mandatory 
retirement of employees prior to age 70, there is an exception 
which permits employers to force individuals employed in a bona 
fide executive or high policymaking position to retire at age 65. 248 
In order to qualify for the exemption, an employee must be: (1) 
Age 65 or older; (2) employed in a bona fide executive or high 
policymaking position for the two year period immediately before 
retirement; and (3) entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual 
retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings or de­
ferred compensation plan or any combination of such plans of the 
employer which equals in the aggregate $27,000, exclusive of bene­
fit amounts attributable to employee contributions and to rollover 
contributions. If necessary, the annual retirement benefit payable 
must be adjusted to equal a straight life annuity with no ancillary 
benefits. 
The EEOC has issued a final Interpretation249 concerning the 
exception for certain executive and high policymaking employees 
which closely follows an earlier Department of Labor proposal. 250 
This Interpretation provides that the exemption is to be construed 
narrowly. The burden is on the employer to demonstrate that each 
element required to satisfy the exemption is met. 251 
performance appraisals appear to be the most satisfactory way of monitoring em­
ployee performance. 
247. The employer's problem is to develop a performance appraisal system 
which is not vulnerable to a charge that it constitutes or perpetuates discrimination. 
See generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (title VII cases); 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970); McGregor, An Uneasy Look at Per­
formance Appraisal, 50 HARV. Bus. REV. 133 (1972); Gery, Minimizing Bias in Ap­
praisal and Promotion 117, 4 EEO TODAY (1977); Brown, Passed Over Executives are 
Suing Their Firms to Demand Promotion, Wall St. J., April 29, 1977 at 1, col.l; B. 
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMEl'o.'T DISCRIMINATION LAW 132-81 (1976). 
248. ADEA § 12(c)(I), 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(c)(l) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
249. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,79&-97 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 1627.17, 1625.12) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
250. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,148-52 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 850.17, 
860.97). 
251. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1625. 12(b)). 
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The employee may be forced to retire as early as age 65 but 
only if he was a bona fide executive or high policymaking employee 
for the entire two-year period prior to retirement. The two-year 
requirement prevents an employer from placing an employee in 
such a position just before age 65 in order to force the employee to 
retire. 252 
In order for an employee to qualify as a bona fide executive, 
the employer must first establish that the employee meets the test 
for a bona fide executive under the overtime pay provisions of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. 253 The Fair Labor Standards Act test 
which is set forth in implementing regulations254 provides that a 
bona fide executive is any employee: (1) Whose primary duty, in­
volving 50% or more of his or her time, consists of the manage­
ment of a business or a recognized department or subdivision 
thereof; (2) who customarily and regularly directs the work of two 
or more employees; (3) who has the authority to hire or to fire 
other employees, or whose suggestions concerning hiring, firing, 
promotion or other changes in employment status are given partic­
ular weight; (4) who customarily and regularly exercises discretion­
ary powers; (5) who does not devote more than 20% of his or her 
hours of work in the work week to activities which are not directly 
and closely related to the performance of work described in one 
through four above;255 (6) who is compensated for his or her serv­
ices on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $155 per week. 
In addition to satisfying the Fair Labor Standards Act for a 
bona fide executive test, the employer also must demonstrate that 
the employee meets further criteria specified in the Conference 
Committee Report.256 The EEOC Interpretation emphasizes that 
the exemption does not apply to "middle management" employees 
but only to a "very few top level employees who exercise substan­
tial executive authority over a significant number of employees and 
a large volume of business."257 Similarly, the Conference Report 
252. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978). 
253. Id. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1625.12(d)(I)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
254. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(l) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1979). 
255. This fifth condition is not applicable to an employee who is in sole charge 
of an independent establishment or a physically separate branch establishment or 
who owns at least 20% interest in an enterprise in which he is employed. 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 541.113, .114 (1979). 
256. H.R. REP., supra note 252. 
257. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1625.12(d)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
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indicated that the exemption should not be as expansively inter­
preted as the exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
should be applied only to "certain high level executives. "258 The 
EEOC Interpretation quotes from the Conference Report state­
ment259 suggesting that the following general categories of employ­
ees constitute bona fide executives under the ADEA: (1) The head 
of a significant and substantial local or regional operation of a cor­
poration;26o (2) individuals in the higher levels of a corporate 
organizational structure who possess comparable or greater levels 
of responsibility than those employees described in (1) above; (3) 
the head of a major department or division located at corporate or 
regional headquarters; and (4) in larger organizations, the immedi­
ate subordinates of executives described in (3) above, if they exer­
cise responsibility, comparable to or greater than that possessed by 
those executives described in (1) above. 
The high policymaking exemption is distinct from the bona 
fide executive exemption. 261 The EEOC Interpretation relies on 
the Conference Report to establish the meaning of high policy­
making position. In fact, the Conference Report is directly quoted 
in the EEOC Interpretation. The legislative history of the 1978 
amendments indicates that the high policymaking exemption is 
available for individuals who have little or no line responsibility, 
have a significant role in the development of a corporate policy, 
. and actively recommend implementation of such policy to top exec­
utive offices. 262 
The Conference Report cites a chief economist or chief re­
search scientist of a corporation as an example of an individual who 
would qualify for the exemption. The Conference Report notes, 
however, that employees who provide staff support to such individ­
uals would not qualify. 263 
In addition to being a bona fide executive or high policy­
making employee, to qualify under the exemption the employee 
must be fully vested in benefits of at least $27,000 calculated as a 
258. H.R. REP., supra note 252. 
259. Id. 
260. Although the Conference Report speaks in terms of employees of "corpo­
rations," it is clear that corporation was intended to be synonymous with any busi­
ness enterprise. Id. See 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29 
C.F.R. § 1625.12(d)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
261. H.R. REP., supra note 252, at 9-10. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to 
be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(e)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
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straight life annuity, payable immediately. In addition, the benefits 
must be received from plans of the employer who f~tiresthe em­
ployee. Specifically, the EEOC Interpretation takes the position 
that to be exempted, an employee must have the option of 
receiving during each year of his or her lifetime following retire­
ment at least $27,000 per year not including amounts attributable 
to social security, rollover contributions, and contributions of pri­
or employers.264 Amounts attributable to employee contributions 
which must be excluded are to be determined in accordance with 
Internal Revenue Service regulations promulgated under Code sec­
tion 411(c).265 These regulations relate to the allocation of accrued 
benefits between employer and employee contributions. No spe­
cific method is suggested to determine amounts attributable to so­
cial security.266 Only retirement income of the employer desiring 
to force the employee to retire can be considered. Since most em­
ployers have plans of their own, this rule presents no problem. 
Some employers, however, participate in a plan with a number of 
other employers. This makes determination of the source of the re­
tirement benefit difficult. If the benefits attributable to prior em­
ployers cannot be readily determined, the EEOC Interpretation 
requires the following formula to be used: Current employers bene­
fits equal total benefits received less the benefit the ,employee 
would have received had the employee never worked for the cur­
rent employer.267 Retirement benefits, however, provided by af­
filiated employers satisfying the controlled group requirement of 
Code section 414(b) and (c) may be considered",Rollover contribu­
tions are specifically excluded. 268 - ~ 
264. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,797 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1627.17) 
(EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
265. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1627.17(e)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). See Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-1 (1979). 
266. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1627.17(e)(1)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). See Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 
187; Rev. Rul. 72-276, 1972-1 C.B. Ill; Announcement 72-7, I.R.B. 1972-4, at 20; 
Rev. Rul. 72-492, 1972-2 C.B. 222; Rev. Rul. 78-92, 1978-1 C.B. 118 for Internal Rev­
enue Service rules on calculating the limits to which Social Security can be inte­
grated with a qualified retirement plan. 
267. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §1627. 17 
(e)(3)(ii)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
268. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1627.17 
(e)(4)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). A rollover contribution is a nontaxable transfer 
of retirement plan assets from one qualified plan to another qualified plan either di­
rectly or indirectly through the intermediary of an individual retirement account or 
annuity (IRA). See I.R:C. §§ 402(a)(5), 403(a)(4), 408(d)(3), 409(b)(3)(C); 45 Fed. Reg. 
57-54-80 (1980) (prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.402(a)-3, 1.403(a)-3, 1.408-1(b)(2)). 
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The $27,000 per year requirement is considered met if the 
employee has the option of receiving upon retirement a lump sum 
benefit with which it is possible to purchase a single life annuity 
with no ancillary benefits yielding at least $27,000 per year. 269 The 
$27,000 per year requirement is also met when the aggregate value 
of the employee's retirement benefits as of the employee's retire­
ment date with respect to payments to be made with his life ex­
pectancy equals $27,000 per year as a single life annuity using 
reasonable actuarial assumptions. 27o Thus, under the EEOC Inter­
pretation, an employee who is entitled to receive an annual 
lifetime retirement benefit of less than $27,000 per year with ancil­
lary benefits, and thus, actuarially worth $27,000 or more, will 
qualify for the exemption although the employee does not have the 
right to receive retirement benefits in a form equal to $27,000 per 
year or more. This represents a liberalization over the Department 
of Labor's proposal. That proposal provided that no employee who 
is required to receive less than $27,000 per year during his or her 
lifetime in retirement because of other benefits being provided 
only after death will fall within the exemption. 271 The Department 
of Labor's proposal would have created problems for plans which 
provide only one form of retirement benefit which is not a single 
life annuity. For example, a defined benefit plan which provides 
the only form of retirement benefit is a qualified joint and survivor 
annuity. A retirement benefit payable during the joint lives of the 
employee and the spouse of $24,000 per year and a survivor annu­
ity payable to the spouse of $12,000 a year may be equal actuarially 
to a single life annuity of more than $27,000. It would not have 
qualified for the exemption under the Department of Labor's pro­
posal, however, because the employee did not have the option to 
receive the benefits in the form of a $27,000 per year single life an­
nuity. 
The $27,000 amount is a static figure not subject to cost 
of living increases. This approach is somewhat surprising because 
ERISA, in several key provisions, establishes dollar limitations for 
pension benefits. In recognition of our inflationary economy, how­
269. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,797 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1627.17(c)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
270. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,797-98 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1627, 
17(c)(4)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation; 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,794 (preamble to In­
terpretative Bulletin). 
271. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,148, 58,149 (1978) (preamble comment to Proposed Inter­
pretative Bulletin) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 850. 17(c)). 
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ever, ERISA subjects those dollar amounts to cost of living adjust­
ments. 272 In time, the $27,000 limit will reach more employees 
than it does presently. Thus, the effect of inflation will make the 
bona fide executive and high policymaking exemptions the critical 
requirements rather than the dollar limitation. 
In a defined contribution plan, the value of the individual's re­
tirement benefit may fluctuate depending upon the investment ex­
perience of the plan. 273 Fluctuations in retirement income may 
make it difficult for personnel managers to make long range deter­
minations as to whether an individual will be eligible for forced re­
tirement at age 65. 
Employers will also have problems with plans which permit 
employees to make withdrawals of employer provided benefits 
while actively employed. The preamble to the EEOC Interpreta­
tion notes that there is nothing to prevent an active employee from 
withdrawing employer contributions from a plan in order to avoid 
receiving a $27,000 retirement benefit. 274 The EEOC Interpreta­
tion also notes that an employer is not entitled to supplement re­
tirement benefits in order to reach the $27,000 limit. 275 
The only retirement benefits which may be counted towards 
the $27,000 annual test are those derived from a pension, profit­
sharing, savings or deferred compensation program or any combi­
nation of such programs. The EEOC Interpretation specifically in­
cludes stock bonus, thrift plans, simplified employee pension plans 
and certain nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. 276 
The Interpretation also suggests that more exotic types of retire­
ment plans may be included. 277 Severance pay plans, however, ap­
pear to be excluded. 278 
272. See, e.g., l.R.C. § 415(d), adjusting dollar limits for the maximum contribu­
tions and benefits permitted under qualified retirement plans and ERISA § 4022(b)(3) 
29 U.S.C. § 1,322(b)(3) (1976) establishing a maximum federally guaranteed qualified 
defined benefit plan benefit amount adjusted in accordance with Social Security in­
creases. 
273. See ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1976); l.R.C. § 414(i) (defining 
defined contribution plans). 
274. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,794 (1979). 
275. ld. 
276. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,798,66,801 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 
1627.I7(d), 1625, 12(J)(2)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
277. ld. Are tax sheltered annuities benefits under l.R.C. § 403(b) funded by 
salary reduction agreements or agreements to forgo a salary increase considered to 
be employer provided benefits? 
278. See 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,794 (1979) (preamble comments to EEOC 
§ 12(c) interpretation). A severance pay plan provides additional benefits out of 
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The $27,000 per year benefit must be an immediate nonfor­
feitable benefit payable at the time of compulsory retirement. The 
EEOC Interpretation considers the nonforfeitable annual retire­
ment benefit to be immediate within the meaning of ADEA's sec­
tion 12(c) only if the first payment of plan benefits is made within 
60 days after the date of compulsory retirement. 279 This sixty day 
rule is more stringent than the ERISA requirement that benefits 
must c~mmence no later than 60 days after the end of the plan 
year in which the employee retires. 280 
The EEOC Interpretation considers the annual retirement 
benefit of a qualified retirement plan to be nonforfeitable if 
the employee is 100% vested. 281 The nonforfeitable exceptions of 
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code may be taken into ac­
count. 282 For example, benefits may be discontinued at death283 
and suspended during periods of reemployment. 284 Nonqualified 
deferred compensation plans are separately considered. 285 The pre­
amble to the EEOC Interpretation indicates that prior to retire­
ment such plans may provide for the forfeiture of benefits. 286 Tax 
considerations dictate this interpretation. Nonforfeitable benefits 
may result in constructive receipt of income and loss of tax 
deferral. So long as employee's rights to benefits are forfeitable, 
there is not constructive receipt. 287 Thus, forfeitability of benefits 
the employer's general assets to increase retirement benefits. See 29 C.F.R. § 
2510.3-2(b) (1979) (defining severance pay plan for purposes of title I of ERISA). 
279. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,796 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12 
(i)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
280. ERISA § 206(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1976); I.R.C. § 401(a)(14); Treas. Reg. § 
1.401(a)-14 (1979). 
281. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,800 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1625.12(k)(I)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
282. ld. See ERISA § 203(a)(3)-(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)-(b) (1976); I.R.C. 
§ 41l(a)(3), (4); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.41l(a)-4,-5 (1977). 
283. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 41l(a)­
(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.41l(a)-4(b)(1) (1977). 
284. ERISA § 203(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)­
(3)(B); 43 Fed. Reg. 59,098 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 2530.203-3). 
285. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,801 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1625.12(K)(I)) (EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
286. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,796-97 (1979). 
287. An interest in a funded deferred compensation plan is not currently taxed 
if it is transferrable or is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. I.R.C. § 83(a) 
(1976). An interest in an unfunded deferred compensation plan is not currently taxed 
if the employees' rights are forfeitable. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1, -2 (1978). An interest in 
an unfunded deferred compensation plan, however, is still not taxed currently even if 
the employees' rights are nonforfeitable if: (1) The agreement is entered into before 
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prior to retirement is desirable for tax reasons. After retirement, 
the EEOC Interpretation requires benefits to be nonforfeitable. 
Many nonqualified deferred compensation plans currently provide 
for loss of benefits to a retiree, if the retiree engages in litigation 
against the employer or obtains employment with a competitor of 
the employer. Such plans have forfeitable retirement benefits and 
cannot be considered when calculating the value of the employee's 
retirement benefits. 288 Finally, the EEOC Interpretation provides 
that a benefit is nonforfeitable only if there is a reasonable expecta­
tion that the plan will be able to meet its obligations. 289 
Ironically, section 12(c) of the ADEA may actually discourage 
the hiring of older executives because, if they do not work out, the 
employer is not entitled to include pensions from a prior employer 
to retire involuntarily the employee prior to age 70. Of course, the 
ADEA permits firing of an older employee for unsatisfactory per­
formance. Traditionally, however, employers have preferred to per­
mit older employees who have unsatisfactory performance to retire. 
The EEOC Interpretation also permits executive or high pol­
icymaking employees who fall within the exemption to be offered a 
lesser position or a part-time position. 29o The rationale for this in-
the compensation is earned, and (2) the employer's promise to pay is not secured in 
any way. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100. See 
also Commissioner v. Olmstead Inc. Life Agency, 304 F.2d 16, 16-21 (8th Cir. 1962) 
(discussing Commissioner v. Oates, 18 T.C. 570, afI'd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 
1953)); Robinson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20, 36 (1965) (citing Veit v. Commis­
sioner, 8 T.C. 809 (1947)); Basila v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 111 (1961); Gann v. Com­
missioner, 31 T.C. 211 (1958). Special limits apply to state nonqualified deferred 
compensation plans. I.R.C. § 457 (1978). Deferred Compensation plans entered into 
with § 501(c) tax exempt organizations .may face special problems. See 43 Fed. Reg. 
4,638 (1978) (proposed regulation at Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16). 
288. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791,66,797 (1979) (preamble to EEOC § 12(c) interpreta­
tion). 
289. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1625, 12(K)(2)) 
(EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). The proposed Department of Labor regulation re­
quired the plan to be "sufficiently funded" to meet its obligations. 43 Fed. Reg. 
58,152 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 860.97(K)(2)). This was omitted in the 
EEOC Interpretation because a "funding" requirement could eliminate all unfunded 
deferred compensation.arrangements from the exemption. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979) 
(preamble to EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). In addition, qualified defined benefit 
plan benefits which are restricted under the early termination rule are not consid­
ered forfeitable. Treas. Reg. § 1. 401-4(c), T.D.6675. The early termination rule re­
stricts payments in excess of a certain amount for the 25 highest paid employees for 
the first ten years after the plan is established or amended, if the plan is not cur­
rently funded or if the plan is terminated within the ten year period. Id. 
290. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(c)) 
(EEOC § 12(c) interpretation). 
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terpretation of section 12(c) is that an employer who is able to force 
an employee to retire should also be able to offer the employee a 
position of lesser status or, in the case of a full-time employee, a 
part-time position. 291 The Interpretation, however, indicates that 
the employer loses the option of forcing an employee to retire 
prior to age 70, if the employer offers the employee a position of 
lesser status or a part-time position which is not a bona fide execu­
tive or high policymaking position. 292 
V. NEED TO REVIEW EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PRACTICES Now 
The EEOC has yet to publish its employee benefit plan 
guidelines. Therefore, employers and their attorneys should begin 
a comprehensive review of their retirement practices and their em­
ployee benefit plans. They should take steps to insure that their 
plans conform to the ADEA as amended. The preamble to the De­
partment of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin notes that its rules are 
"effective immediately," which means as of May 25, 1979.293 The 
Interpretative Bulletin also notes that for the period of time be­
tween January 1, 1979, when the law became effective as to most 
employers, and May 25, 1979, when the Interpretative Bulletin was 
published, employers who relied in good faith on the older Depart­
ment of Labor's Interpretative Bulletin or an opinion letter of the 
Wage and Hour Administrator will not be held liable for failure to 
comply with the new rules. 294 The Interpretative Bulletin notes, 
however, that some benefit practices "could never be proved to 
have been in good faith" conforming with the older interpretation. 
One such practice would be a total benefit cut off on the basis of 
age for employees between ages 40 and 65 and, since January 
1979, for employees between ages 40 and 70. 295 
After May 25, 1979, the Department of Labor notes that prob­
lems in achieving prompt compliance may be considered in the 
conciliation of individual cases. The Department of Labor and the 
EEOC, however, will evaluate whether prompt compliance "could 
feasibly be achieved" through existing insurance products or partial 
self insurance. 296 The EEOC has noted that the Department of 
291. 44 Fed. Reg. 66,791, 66,795-96 (1979) (preamble to EEOC § 12(c) interpre­
tation). 
292. ld. 
293. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,657 (1979). 
294. ld. 
295. ld. 
296. ld. The phrase "partial self insurance" is troublesome. The phrase could 
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Labor's Interpretative Bulletins may be relied upon until it pub­
lishes its own guidelines. 297 
Conformance with the ADEA amendments, recently enacted 
state laws, and federal regulatory interpretations will require signif­
icant changes in many employee benefit plans and especially in 
welfare benefit plans. A number of key policy decisions should be 
addressed by employers. The employer should initially make a ba­
sic business decision either to encourage, discourage or maintain a 
position of neutrality with respect to the retention of older employ­
ees. All employers, and especially those employers who wish to 
discourage the continued employment of older workers to the ex­
tent permitted by law, should take steps to establish a formal per­
formance appraisal program in order to monitor the quality of work 
of all its employees. Unless an employee is a bona fide executive or 
high policymaking employee, the only way to terminate employee 
services prior to age 70 is by demonstrating unsatisfactory per­
formance. Given heightened awareness among employees of the 
ADEA, employers must be able to produce tangible evidence of 
unsatisfactory employment of an older worker in order to avoid a 
discrimination action. 
Employers should examine current retirement patterns of 
their employees to determine how many employees are likely to 
elect to defer retirement after age 65. Many personnel specialists 
believe that more workers will elect to defer retirement in the fu­
ture. The employer should establish a separate statement of retire­
ment policy, including a statement of whether the employer 
intends to use the exception for bona fide executive and high 
policymaking employees. Retirement plan benefits and welfare 
plan benefits for older workers should be reviewed carefully to de­
termine whether the plans provide benefits consistent with the em­
ployer's philosophy of encouraging or discouraging continued em­
ployment after age 65. 
The cost implications of any employee benefit plan options for 
present and future employees also should be reviewed. The em­
ployer should consider possible exposure to litigation if employee 
benefit plan practices depart from the requirements of the Inter­
pretative Bulletin. To the extent that amendments to the existing 
be interpreted to permit the EEOC to claim that prompt compliance could "feasibly 
be achieved" in any insured employee benefit plan by having the employer pay ad­
ditional benefits not provided by or available through insurance companies out of its 
general assets. 
297. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,974 (1979). 
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benefit plans are necessary, employers should amend plan docu­
ments and the summary plan descriptions. They should also make 
any other changes necessary to comply with the reporting and dis­
closure requirements of ERISA. If a qualified pension plan must be 
amended, the plan should be filed for review with the Internal 
Revenue Service. Once the changes in the employee benefit pro­
grams are formalized, the changes should be communicated to em­
ployees. 298 Employers may wish to establish pre-retirement coun­
seling programs to provide employees with an informal choice 
about retirement at various ages. 299 
Given the growing numbers and political power of older Amer­
icans,300 employers can expect additional demands concerning em­
ployee rights. Consideration has already been given to eliminating 
compulsory retirement. Similar consideration has been given to 
forbidding the cessation of benefit accruals at normal retirement 
age in defined benefit pension plans. Employers may wish to antic­
ipate these trends and plan accordingly. 
298. See text accompanying notes 55-64 supra. 
299. See, e.g., Facing Up to Retirement; More Companies Help Ease the Way, 
N.Y. Times, August 20, 1979, at C19, col. 1. 
300. The 65 and over population in the United States was 10.7% in 1976. 
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, PENSION FACTS 1978-197940-45 (1979). It 
is projected to be 12.7% in 2010 and 18.3% in 2030. Id. 
00 
APPENDIX 
"'" "'" STATE AGE DISCRIMINA nON LAWS 
Exception to Exception to 
permit involun­ permit forced 
tary retirement retirement of 
Does law Minimum at an earlier highly paid 
apply to number of age for par- employees re-
private employees ticipants in ceiving sub­
industry before law Protected pension benefit stantial retire-
Jurisdiction , Law employers? applies age group plans ment benefits 
~ 
United States 29 U,S,C. §§ 621·634 (1976). 
29 C.F.R. § 850, § 860.120 (1979), 
Yes 25 (by 
amendment) 
40 to 65 No, see 43 Fed. 
Reg. 43,269 
(1978) (to be 
Yes, $27,000/yr. t>l en 
;:;; 
codified in 29 ~ C.F.R. § 860.120) 
(Proposed Depart­
ment of Labor's 
<: 
t>l 
Interpretative ~ 
Alaska 18 ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1962). Yes No minimum Employees of 
Bulletin) 
No No 
t>l 
<: 
() 
all ages &: 
California CAL. LAB. CODE § 
SuPp. 1979). 
1420.1 (Deering Yes 5 From 40 on, 
no upper 
No Yes, $27,OOO/yr, <: tI 
Jimit &: 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8·2·116, -117 Yes No minimum 18 to 60 No - No ~ 
(I974). 
~ Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31·122, -126 
( 1979). 
Yes 3 Employees of 
all ages 
Yes, at age 70 
(restricted to state 
and municipal 
employees and 
Yes, $27\OOO/yr. -<:-t>l 
~ 
public school 
teachers) 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710,711 (a), Yes 4 40 to 65 Yes Yes, $27,OOO/yr. 
(h) & (i) (1975). 
District of 
Columbia 
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6·2202, -2221, 
-2222 (1973 & SuPp. V 1978). 
Yes No minimum 18 to 65 Yes No '< 
~ 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.211 (6). 13.261 
(I)(a), (8)(b) (West Supp_ 1978), 
Yes 15 Employees of 
all ages 
Yes No 
"" e;, 
-l 
Ceorgia* GA. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1701, 1707 No 15 40 to 65 Yes No <0 
• repealed 7/1/80 (Cum. SuPp. 1979). 
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Exception to Exception to ~ 
pennit involun­ permit forced 
tary retirement retirement of 
Does law Minimum at an earlier highly paid 
apply to number of age for par­ employees re­
private employees ticipants in ceiving sub­
industry before law Protected pension benefit stantial retire­
Jurisdiction Law employers? applies age group plans ment benefits 
Hawaii HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378·2(2), -2(7), Yes I 16 to no Yes No 
378-9(4) (1976). upper age 
limit 
Idaho IDAHO CODE §§ 44-1601, -1602 (1977). Yes None No lower Yes No 
limit to 
age 60 :.­
o 
Illinois ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 881, 883 Yes I 45 to no Yes No t'l 
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979). upper age 
limit 
\:l ..... 
en 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-2-1, -II Yes I 40 to 65 Yes No 
C"l 
:;x, 
Iowa 
(Burns 1974). 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.I, _6(2)-(5), 
.13 (1975 & West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
Yes 4 18 (unless at 
younger age 
is lawfully an 
adult) to no 
Yes No 
E::..... 
~ 
:::l o 
~ upper age 
limit, except 
over 45 for 
bona fide ap­
prenticeship 
employment 
programs 
Kentucky Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 344.030, _100, Yes 8 40 to 65 Yes No 
.110(2)(e) (1977). 
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:893 (West Yes 25 Under 50 Yes (if pension No 
1964) (law refers to firing & hiring covers periods 
and not compensation). of service no 
greater than 35 
years and pays 
out no less than 
$45 a quarter) ~ 
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~ 
Jurisdiction Law 
Does law 
apply to 
private 
industry 
employers? 
Minimum 
number of 
employees 
before law 
applies 
Protected 
age group 
Exception to 
permit involun­
tary retirement 
at an earlier 
age for par­
ticipants in 
pension benefit 
plans 
Exception to 
permit forced 
retirement of 
highly paid 
employees re­
ceiving sub­
stantial retire­
ment benefits 
Mahle ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4571­
4574 (1964 &: West SuPP. 1979). 
Yes None Minimum age 
when minor 
is lawfully 
allowed to 
work to no 
Yes No 
~ 
V> 
~ 
upper limit ~ 
Maryland MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 15, 16 
(Michie 1979). 
Yes, except 
private mem­
bersbip club 
(other than a 
labor organi­
zalion) 
15 No upper 
or lower 
limit 
Yes No <: 
t>l 
~ 
t>l 
<: 
G') 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, 
§§ I, 4 (1971). 
Yes, except 
private non­
profit clubs 
6 40 to 65 No No ~ 
tI 
~ 
Michigan MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2201, 
.2211 (West SuPP. 1979). 
Yes 4 None Yes No ~ 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.81, 363.02, 
03, (West Supp. 1979). 
Yes 1 Mandatory 
retirement 
at age 70 
permitted. 
differences 
Yl'S Yes, $27.000/yr. ~ :s 
t>l 
~ 
in treabnent 
allowed for 
over 59 or 
less than 21 
Montana 
Nebraska 
MONT. REV. CoDES ANN. § 49-2-101(8). 
-303 (1979). 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1001 to -1004 
(1978). 
Yes, except 
for non-profit 
corporations 
Yes 
1 
25 
None 
40 to 65 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
~ 
~ 
c;, 
-l 
<D 
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~ Exception to Exception to 
permit involun­ permit forced 
tary retirement retirement of 
Does law Minimum at an earlier highly paid 
apply to number of age for par­ employees re­
private employees ticipants in ceiving sub­
industry before law Protected pension benefit stantial retire­
Jurisdiction Law employers? applies age group plans ment benefits 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.310, .330, Yes, except 15 None Yes No 
.350 (1973). Indian tribes 
and I.R.C. 
§ 501(c) pri­
vate clubs 
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2, 
:3, :8 (1966 & Supp. 1979). 
Yes, except 
no non-profit 
6 None Yes No )­
organizations ~ 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 
Cum. SuPP. 1979). 
(West Yes 1 None No No \:l.... 
'" New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2, -7, -9 Yes 4 None Yes, may be No n
(1978). forced to retire 
age 65 if plan 
qualifies under 
ERISA 
~ 
s::.... 
~ 
New York 
North 
N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 292, 296 
(McKinney 1972 & West Supp_ 1979). 
N.C. GEN. STAT_ § 143-422.2 (1978). 
Yes 
Yes 
4 
15 
18 to 65 
None 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
::l o 
<: 
Carolina 
North N.D. CEST. CoOF. § 34-01-17 (Supp. Yes 1 40 to 65 Yes No 
Dakota 1977). 
Ohio OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 4101.17 Yes 1 40 to 70 No Yes, $27,OOO/yr. 
(Page Supp. 1979). 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010, .015, Yes, except 1 18 to 65, Yes No 
.028, .030 (1977). certain indus­ but compulsory 
trial employers retirement of 
and bona fide employees 
church or sec­ required by 
tarian religious law at an age 
groups under 65 years 
is not an 
unlawful ~ 
employment ...... 
practice 
APPENDIX - STATE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS (continued) t; 
t<l 
Jurisdiction Law 
Does law 
apply to 
private 
industry 
employers? 
Minimum 
number of 
E'mployees 
before law 
applies 
Protected 
age group 
Exception to 
permit involun­
tary retirement 
at an earlier 
age for par­
ticipants in 
pension benefit 
plan. 
Exception to 
permit forced 
retirement of 
highly paid 
employees re­
ceiving sub­
stantial retire­
ment benefits 
Pennsylvania PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954, 955 
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979). 
Yes 4 None Yes No 
~ 
en 
PUE'rto Rico P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, §§ 146, 
151(1) (Supp. 1978). 
Yes No minimum hfinimum 
age when 
minor is 
No No ~ 
~ 
lawfully 
allowed to ~ 
work to 65 ~ 
Rhode Island R.T. GEN. LAws § 28·6·1, ·5 (1968). Yes, except 
private domes­
tic service 
1 45 to 65 Yes No ~ 
() 
~ South 
Carolina 
Texas 
Utah 
S.C. CODE § 1·13·80 (1976 & Cum. 
Supp. 1979). 
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 
6252·)4 (Vernon 1970). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34·35·6(1) (a), (£), 
§ 34·35·6(3) (Supp. 1979). 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
15 
No minimum 
number 
25 
40 to 70 
21 to 65 
40 to no 
upper limit 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes, $27,OOO/yr. 
No 
No 
I::l 
r;: 
~ 
f;l
:s 
t'"l 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010, 
.040, .180 (West Supp. 1978). 
Yes 8 Noneo No No ~ 
West 
Virginia 
W. VA. CODE § 5·11·3, ·4, .8, ·9(a) 
( 1979). 
Yes 12 40 to 65 Yes No 
\Visconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. § 1I1.32(3)(a), 
(:i)(a), (!i) (b), (5)(e) (West 1974 
& Cum. Supp. 1979). 
No No minimum 
number 
40 to 65 Yes No 
~ 
t<l 
o But see Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 892, 568 P.2d 764, 767 (1977) (bolds 40 to 65 i. protected age group). ~ 
